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B. Pre-Trial and Trial (and some Post-Trial) Stage Rights: Section 11
1. Introduction
2. “Charged with an offence”
3. Specific Paragraphs
a) Paragraph (a): “to be informed without unreasonable delay of the specific
offence”
b) Paragraph (b): “to be tried within a reasonable time”
c) Paragraph (c): “not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings against that
person in respect of the offence”
d) “to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal”
i) Presumption of Innocence
ii) “Fair and Public Hearing”
iii) “Independent and Impartial Tribunal”
e) “not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause”
f) “except in the case of an offence under military law tried before a military
tribunal to the benefit of trial by jury where the maximum punishment for the
offence is imprisonment for five years or a more severe punishment”
g) “not to be found guilty on account of any act or omission unless, at the time of the
act or omission, it constituted an offence under Canadian or international law or
was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the
community of nations”
h) “if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it again and, if finally found
guilty and punished for the offence, not to be tried or punished for it again”
i) “if found guilty of the offence and if the punishment for the offence has been
varied between the time of commission and the time of sentencing, to the benefit of
the lesser punishment”
C. Conclusion

A. Investigative Stage Rights: Sections 9 and 10
1. Introduction
The state sometimes needs coercive powers to enforce its criminal and other laws.
Because Canada is, however, a free and democratic society, those powers cannot be unlimited. It
is the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which mediates the balance between the
legitimate interests of the state to investigate offences and the equally legitimate interests of the
individual to be free from unjustified state intrusions.
One context in which those interests most acutely come into conflict is at the
investigative stage, and the rights in the Charter which are most relevant there are sections 8, 9
and 10: rights with regard to search and seizure, detention, and arrest. Section 8 is of course the
subject of its own chapter, but it is worth briefly contrasting the general impact of those three
sections.
For the most part, section 8 has functioned to act as a limit on state power. Some search
powers which existed pre-Charter have ceased to exist, and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
with regard to unreasonable search and seizure has kept all search powers within certain limits.
There is much more to be said, of course, but broadly speaking section 8 has been successful in
restraining exercises of state power: police have fewer and more limited search powers because
of the Charter.
Section 10, dealing with rights on arrest, was not for the most part designed to limit state
power: rather, it was meant to expand individual rights. In some cases “limiting state power” and
“expanding individual rights” are just two sides of the same coin: to say that the police do not
have the power to search without a warrant is equally to say that an individual has the right not to
be searched unless the police have a warrant. However, the two do not have to be part of a zero
sum game in that way. Section 10 has not in any way limited the ability of the police to perform

arrests: in contrast to search powers, precisely the same arrest powers exist now as existed preCharter, and their appropriateness has not been the subject of Charter challenge.2 Nonetheless,
the Charter has guaranteed that individuals who are arrested are now entitled to be given
particular information about consulting a lawyer and, in many circumstances, the actual
opportunity to consult a lawyer.
Section 9, on the other hand, has in many ways had a retrograde effect on individual
rights. In the first thirty years of the Charter the right to be free from arbitrary detention has not
given any additional rights to individuals, nor has it limited the powers which police have.
Paradoxically, the primary impact of section 9 in the investigative process has been to expand the
range of powers available to the police. However, that is not the entire story, for two reasons.
First, section 9 is applicable outside the investigative stage to other types of detentions such as
security certificates or dangerous offenders: although section 9 has not had a great deal of impact
in those areas (and indeed as we will see below those cases create some ambiguity over what the
word “arbitrary” means), it has at least not expanded state power regarding those detention
regimes. Second, the Supreme Court seems to have recognized the counter-intuitive effect of
section 9, and recent jurisprudence suggests that some judges at least would favour a change in
approach.
We turn now to discuss sections 9 and 10. We shall first discuss each of those rights
separately, setting out the basic principles which govern them. Following that we shall discuss
the unsettled issues in relation to each those rights.
2. Section 9: Arbitrary Detention3
Section 9 guarantees the right to be free from arbitrary detention, which therefore
requires consideration of two terms: “arbitrary” and “detention”. It is remarkable that as late as
2
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2009, when the Supreme Court decided Grant,4 neither of those terms had been fully defined by
the Court.5 Happily that situation no longer obtains and, although there are of course always
issues around the edges, reasonably complete definitions have now been put forward. It makes
sense to begin by discussing the concept of detention, since if a person is not detained at all, the
question of whether it occurred arbitrarily does not arise.
a) “Detention”
The concept of detention is established primarily in two Supreme Court decisions nearly
a quarter century apart: Therens6 in 1985 and Grant in 2009. In Therens the Court was dealing
with an accused who was stopped for a breathalyser test: he argued (under section 10(b)) that he
was entitled to the right to counsel before the test, on the basis that he had been detained.
Although with the benefit of today’s perspective it seems obvious that a person who is flagged
down by the police and would face criminal charges for refusing to comply is “detained”, that
was not the pre-Charter position. In Chromiak the Court had settled a Bill of Rights challenge on
those same facts by concluding that there had been no detention.7
Therens did more than was strictly necessary to settle the case in front of it: rather than
simply decided that Therens himself was detained, the Court offered a definition of “detention”
which was applicable to both section 9 and section 10.8 They articulated three types of
detention: (i) physical detention, where a person is actually subject to physical constraint, (ii)
detention by lawful compulsion, where there are legal consequences for the failure to comply
4
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with a police officer’s demand (as in Therens), and (iii) psychological detention, where although
in fact the police have no authority to detain a person that person reasonably feels compelled to
remain.9
These definitions of detention, however, are specific to the criminal investigation context,
or situations which are similar. Students in school, for example, might feel or in fact be
compelled to go to or remain in various locations, but they are not “detained” in a Charter
sense.10 Similarly, persons who face routine questioning by a customs officer at the border are
not detained.11
The concepts of detention by physical constraint or by legal compulsion have not
generally created difficulties to apply in practice. Psychological detention, on the other hand, was
much more ambiguous, though it was not until Grant that the Court returned to the issue to offer
a more complete definition.12 In practical terms, the question of whether someone is
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The Court summarized the result in Therens, supra note 6, in R v Thomsen, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640 [Thomsen] at 649:
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person by a demand or direction which may have significant legal consequence and which prevents or
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3. The necessary element of compulsion or coercion to constitute a detention may arise from criminal
liability for refusal to comply with a demand or direction, or from a reasonable belief that one does not
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The Court also seems, in Grant, supra note 4, to collapse the distinction between detention by legal compulsion
and psychological detention: both still exist, but the former is seen as a subset of the latter. The Court holds at para
44:
Detention under ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter refers to a suspension of the individual’s liberty interest by a
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psychologically detained tends to arise in one of two circumstances. First, on occasion a person
attends at a police station and is questioned: whether they did so by consent or because they felt
compelled to is not always easy to determine.13 Second, the police sometimes engage a person on
the street in conversation, which can lead to more intrusive things: whether that person feels an
obligation to remain is often unclear. In Grant the Court was faced with the latter situation, but
the test for psychological detention they articulated is meant to cover all circumstances.
The Court adopted a claimant-centred approach to the issue, which decides the question
of psychological detention by the way in which the situation would be perceived by a reasonable
person in the circumstances of the person alleged to be detained. They held:
In cases where there is no physical restraint or legal obligation, it may not be clear
whether a person has been detained. To determine whether the reasonable person in the
individual’s circumstances would conclude that he or she had been deprived by the state
of the liberty of choice, the court may consider, inter alia, the following factors:
(a)

The circumstances giving rise to the encounter as they would reasonably be

perceived by the individual: whether the police were providing general assistance;
maintaining general order; making general inquiries regarding a particular
occurrence; or, singling out the individual for focussed investigation.
(b)

The nature of the police conduct, including the language used; the use of

physical contact; the place where the interaction occurred; the presence of others;
and the duration of the encounter.
(c)

The particular characteristics or circumstances of the individual where

relevant, including age; physical stature; minority status; level of sophistication.14

individual has a legal obligation to comply with the restrictive request or demand, or a reasonable person
would conclude by reason of the state conduct that he or she had no choice but to comply.
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The existence of that test has not of course resolved all ambiguity, particularly as it is still
relatively new and is being worked out by lower courts: we shall discuss this issue further below
under the heading “Unsettled Issues”.
b) “Arbitrary”
There was considerable uncertainty for many years over exactly what the term “arbitrary”
meant, or did not mean: it was that fact which in part led to the paradoxical conclusion noted in
the introduction, that the main legacy of section 9 to date has been the expansion of police
powers. That point will be explained in a moment, but it is best to start by setting out the current
state of the law.
The Court held in Grant that:
A lawful detention is not arbitrary within the meaning of s. 9 (Mann, at para. 20), unless
the law authorizing the detention is itself arbitrary. Conversely, a detention not
authorized by law is arbitrary and violates s. 9.15
As they observe, this is parallel to the Collins test for determining whether a search has
violated section 8 of the Charter: the action must be authorized by law, and the law must not be
arbitrary.16 It is worth unpacking this test for section 9, since it was a long time before the Court
settled on it, and that delay had consequences.
The rule now is that “arbitrariness” and “lawfulness” are identical concepts: as a result
detention law and section 9 law are now equivalent, just as Collins made search and seizure law
equivalent to section 8 law. Equating those two things, as the Court notes, involves committing
15
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Grant, ibid. at para 56:
This approach mirrors the framework developed for assessing unreasonable searches and seizures under s.
8 of the Charter. Under R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, and subsequent cases dealing with s. 8, a search
must be authorized by law to be reasonable; the authorizing law must itself be reasonable; and the search
must be carried out in a reasonable manner.

to two propositions: if there is lawful authority for a detention it is not arbitrary, but if there is
not lawful authority for it then it is arbitrary. There has never been any doubt about the former
proposition (subject to a challenge to the legislation itself), but the latter proposition was in doubt
until Grant. The leading view in lower courts was that something more than mere failure to
comply with lawful authority was needed to render a detention or arrest arbitrary,17 and the
Supreme Court had consciously left the point open.18
Equating “arbitrary” with “unlawful” is a sensible decision, but as it is so recent its full
future implications have yet to be determined: this is a point to be discussed below under the
heading “Unsettled Issues”. For the moment, it is helpful to look backward, and see why the
failure to do so earlier contributed to the counter-intuitive effect of section 9 on individual rights.
Consider for a moment what it means to have the rule “a detention authorized by law is
not arbitrary” while not having the rule “a detention not authorized by law is arbitrary.” That
means that courts have a clear method of finding that there was no section 9 breach (the
detention was authorized by law) but they do not have a clear method of finding that there was a
breach.
With most rights, there is a clear test delineating when it has been violated: section 9
lacked that for many years. On the other hand, courts did have a way of finding that there was no
breach of section 9, which was by concluding that there was a power allowing the police to act as
they did. Since the powers of the police are not limited by statute – that is, new common law
police powers can be created at any time – it was always possible to resolve the section 9 issue
by deciding that the police were authorized at common law.
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This trend began in Dedman, the case which is taken as establishing the availability of
common law powers in Canada.19 The accused had been stopped in his vehicle and was made
subject to a breathalyser demand, but he argued that the police had not had authority to stop him
in the first place. The majority of the Court concluded that although there was no statutory
authority for the stop, it was justified at common law based on the Waterfield test.20
Lower courts continued that approach, most notably with the Ontario Court of Appeal
decision in Simpson, finding a common law police power to detain a person based on “articulable
cause”.21 Simpson was overtaken by the Supreme Court decision in Mann, which found a
common law power of “investigative detention”, as well as a common law power to search
incident to investigative detention.22 Clayton followed next, authorizing at common law the
detention of individuals who were leaving a location where illegal guns had been reported.23 In
each case the creation of the power was a way of rejecting the argument “this detention violated
section 9 because it was not authorized by law.”24
There is much which can (and has been) said about whether it is sensible criminal law
policy to create common law police powers at all, to create them in the particular way the Court
has begun to, or about the particular powers of detention which have been created.25 None of
19

R v Dedman, [1985] 2 SCR 2. Dedman is not a Charter case, but the issue is the same: was the detention
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During this same general period the Court also created common law police powers in Godoy and Kang Brown. R v
Godoy, [1999] 1 SCR 311 authorized police to enter premises to investigate a disconnected 911 call. R v KangBrown, [2008] 1 SCR 456 [Kang Brown] is usually taken to have found a common law power to use sniffer dogs
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those issues need to be pursued here. The important point in this context is simply to note the
paradoxical effect referred to earlier: the major impact of section 9 cases to date has not been to
protect individual rights, but rather has been to create new police powers. Arguing that a new
common law power should be recognized, with the result that there will be no Charter violation,
is always an arrow in the Crown’s quiver, and sometimes succeeds.26 There have been some
rumblings from the Supreme Court suggesting that this tendency should be reined in, and so
perhaps change is in the offing, but that is not yet the majority opinion.27
Simpson” (2004) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 935; Benjamin L. Berger, “Race and Erasure in R. v. Mann” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th)
58; Tim Quigley, “Mann, It's a Disappointing Decision” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 41; David M. Tanovich, “The
Colourless World of Mann” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 47; Patrick Healy, “Investigative Detention in Canada” [2005]
Crim. L.R. 98; Joseph R Marin, “R. v. Mann: Further Down the Slippery Slope” (2005) 42 Alta. L. Rev. 1123; James
Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J.
1; Steve Coughlan, “Common Law Police Powers and the Rule of Law” (2007) 47 CR 6th 266; Richard Jochelson,
“Crossing the Rubicon: Of Sniffer Dogs, Justifications, and Preemptive Deference” (2008) 13 Rev Const Stud 209;
Steve Coughlan, Criminal Procedure 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at pp. 17-20; and Don Stuart “The Charter
Balance Against Unscrupulous Law and Order Politics” in Benjamin L. Berger and James Stribopoulos, Unsettled
Legacy: Thirty Years of Criminal Justice under the Charter (Toronto: LexisNexis 2012).
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In Kang-Brown, supra note 24, Justice LeBel for a cohort of four judges declined to create a new common law
power applicable to drug-sniffer dogs, on the basis that it was a task more appropriate for Parliament. The other five
judges, however (in divisions of 2, 2 and 1) elected to create a common law power. Justice Binnie, (who ironically
had been critical of the majority’s approach in Clayton, supra note 18, to creating a common law power there) for
himself and Chief Justice McLachlin held at para 22 that:
In fairness to litigants, the Court ought not, in my respectful view, to waver unpredictably between the
willingness of the Court to explore adjustments in the common law of detention or search and seizure based
on reasonable suspicion, as in the recent cases of R. v. Mann, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, 2004 SCC 52
(investigative detention), and R. v. Clayton, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725, 2007 SCC 32 (detention, search and
seizure), and the “hands off” or “leave it to Parliament” attitude my colleague advocates in this case. How
are litigants to anticipate whether they will find the Court in a “can do” mode or a “leave it to Parliament”
mode? In my view, Mann and Clayton resolved the Court’s attitude to this particular area of common law
police powers in favour of the former. We have crossed the Rubicon.
Aucoin, supra note 26, can be seen as reining in the use of common law powers to some small extent. The Court
there notes that the power to detain exists where it is reasonably necessary in the totality of the circumstances:

So far we have considered the first part of the test under section 9: that the detention is
authorized by law. There are things to say about the other portion of the test as well, that the law
itself is not arbitrary. In effect, the case law in that area has also, in some ways, resulted in the
expansion of police powers.
The earliest cases on section 9 were not cast at the time in the specific context of asking
the Grant question “is the law arbitrary”, but that is the role they should be seen as filling now.
We have already discussed the vehicle stop in Dedman: although the legality of the stop was at
issue there, it was not a Charter case. Two subsequent cases, however, Hufsky and Ladouceur,
pursued the same issue of vehicle stops in relation to section 9.28 In both of those cases, the
police were acting under provincial statutory authority to stop vehicles. Hufsky involve a fixed
checkpoint, but Ladouceur concerned a “roving random stop”: that is (in the words of the four
judge dissent) the ability of the police to “stop any vehicle at any time, in any place, without
having any reason to do so.” The majority in each case found that the detentions were arbitrary,
but that the section 9 violation in each case was saved under section 1. The important points to
pull out of this are the definition of “arbitrary” and the impact of saving the violation.
Let us deal with the latter issue first, since it is briefer. The dissenting judges in
Ladouceur describe saving roving random stops as “the last straw”, observing that “[f]or the
motorist, this means a total negation of the freedom from arbitrary detention guaranteed by s. 9
of the Charter.”29 This must be seen as in large measure an explanation for the long delay in
developing a real section 9 jurisprudence: what would be the point for an accused in arguing

importantly, they took the potential impairment of the accused’s privacy interests to be one of the circumstances to
be considered. The issue was whether a police officer had been authorized to place an accused in the back of a
police car in order to write him a ticket: the officer had searched the accused precisely because he was to be put in
the police car, which had turned up evidence of a drug offence. The Court held, at para. 39, that “in order to justify
securing the appellant in the back seat — knowing that this would also entail a pat-down search — detaining the
appellant in that manner had to be reasonably necessary” [emphasis added]. In other words, the Court held one
should not reason “given the accused was detained, could he be searched?”, but rather “given the accused would be
searched, could he be detained?” That approach imposes some internal limits on the creation of new powers.
28

Hufsky, supra note 8; R v Ladouceur, [1990] 1 SCR 1257.
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Ladouceur, ibid. at para 8.

arbitrary detention if even this last straw could be saved under section 1? Given that arbitrary
detentions (at least in the investigative context) were likely to be accompanied by possible
section 8 or section 10(b) claims, it was much more worthwhile for defence counsel to direct
their arguments in those directions.
The more complicated point is the definition of “arbitrary” offered in those cases. On the
one hand, it is the only explicit general definition offered of that term to date by the Supreme
Court. On the other hand, it is clearly not adequate, and it is not the only definition which has in
fact been used. This must be regarded as the most significant issue around the structure of
section 9 which has not yet been developed.
The Court in Hufsky held that “[a] discretion is arbitrary if there are no criteria, express or
implied, which govern its exercise.”30 This definition was adopted and employed by the Court in
subsequent judgments, and continues to be cited by lower courts today.31
Certainly it is a definition of “arbitrary” which was sufficient for the purposes of the
particular vehicle stops in question, and the concern with unfettered police discretion is an
appropriate one. It is reasonable to think that a complete absence of criteria makes a stop
arbitrary: the difficulty is in treating that as the definition of “arbitrary”, and therefore requiring
an absence of criteria in order to say that a detention is arbitrary.
Fundamentally, there is a difference between “I stopped him for no reason” and “I
stopped him for no good reason”. The “no criteria” standard adopts the former approach, but
really it seems as though something like the latter would be more appropriate. To take the most
obvious example, a detention based on racial profiling certainly ought to be seen as violating
section 9, but it is not based on no criteria: rather, it is based on improper criteria.

30
31

Hufsky, supra note 8 at para 13.

For example, the Court used this same definition in Ladouceur, supra note 28, R v Wilson, [1990] 1 SCR 1291, R
v Macooh, [1993] 2 SCR 802 and R v Mellenthin, [1992] 3 SCR 615 and outside the vehicle stop context in R v
Pearson, [1992] 3 SCR 665 [Pearson] and R v Morales, [1992] 3 SCR 711. Recent lower court decisions citing it
include R v Humphrey, 2011 ONSC 3024 or R v Henderson, 2011 ONSC 2392.

This point has of course been recognized, and is reflected in some decisions. In Storrey,
for example, the Court held:
[T]here is no indication that the arrest was made because a police officer was biased
towards a person of a different race, nationality or colour, or that there was a personal
enmity between a police officer directed towards the person arrested. These factors, if
established, might have the effect of rendering invalid an otherwise lawful arrest.32
Similarly in Nolet, the Court seems to adopt the reasoning of the Ontario Court of Appeal
in Brown v. Durham Regional Police Force33 when it held:
While I can find no sound reason for invalidating an otherwise proper stop because the
police used the opportunity afforded by that stop to further some other legitimate interest,
I do see strong policy reasons for invalidating a stop where the police have an additional
improper purpose. Highway safety concerns are important, but they should not provide
the police with a means to pursue objects which are themselves an abuse of the police
power or are otherwise improper.34
These decision seem to presume that police need to be acting on proper criteria in order
to avoid violating section 9, not just on some criteria.
This confusion over exactly what “arbitrary” means continues if one expands
consideration beyond street-level detentions at the investigative stage to more formal detentions
created by statutory schemes. Section 9 has been considered by the Supreme Court in cases
32
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dealing with the dangerous offender provisions,35 with automatic detention under the former
insanity provisions of the Code,36 with the security certificate scheme in the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act,37 and with the bail provisions in the Code.38 In some cases, such as the
bail provisions or dangerous offender provisions, the Court seems to treat the presence or
absence of criteria as the issue settling whether the detention was arbitrary or not. In dealing with
security certificates, on the other hand, the Court holds that “[d]etention is not arbitrary where
there are ‘standards that are rationally related to the purpose of the power of detention’”, which
would seem to mean that the right criteria must be employed.39 Muddying the waters still further,
that decision concludes that the lack of review for those held under security certificates “violates
the guarantee against arbitrary detention in s. 9 of the Charter, a guarantee which encompasses
the right to prompt review of detention under s. 10(c) of the Charter.”40 This seems to be saying
that avoiding arbitrariness actually has some substantive content, entirely apart from the
procedural “no criteria/proper criteria” confusion.41
As a final word on the unsettled meaning of “arbitrary” in section 9, it is worth observing
that there is also ambiguity over a similar point in section 7. In the past few years “arbitrariness”
has begun to be developed as a principle of fundamental justice, though as the Court has
observed “[t]he jurisprudence on arbitrariness is not entirely settled.”42 It will not necessarily be
the case that the term has the same meaning in both section 7 and section 9, and the current
section 7 case law does not make that result seem likely. It is not ideal to have the same term
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mean different things in two sections of the Charter: nonetheless there certainly is a good
argument that many concerns about using improper criteria to make decisions could be seen as a
section 7 issue rather than a section 9 issue. In Lyons, for example, the Court holds that concerns
about the procedural guarantees leading to a dangerous offender designation could raise section 7
issues and that concerns about the fairness of the detention could raise section 12 issues, but that
neither of those issues mean that the detention is arbitrary within the meaning of section 9.43
Whatever the ultimate result, however, it remains true at present that the largest
inadequately-resolved question in section 9 is what it means to say that a law authorizing a
detention is arbitrary.
3. Section 10: Rights on Arrest or Detention44
Unlike section 9, section 10 of the Charter was among the earliest to develop a settled
jurisprudence: many early cases developed the contours of this provision, and for the most part
there has been little change since those initial articulations. Section 10 did not bring about
fundamental change so much as it added on a few extra responsibilities: police are now required
to ensure that a person is aware of the right to consult counsel and are required to take certain
steps where the person indicates a desire to do so. To some extent, however, this only raised to a
constitutional guarantee and added a few extra requirements to the then-existing practices of
many police forces.
Section 10 of the Charter creates three rights for a person who is arrested or detained:
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(a) to be informed promptly of the reasons therefor;
(b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right; and
(c) to have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas corpus and to be
released if the detention is not lawful.
It is section 10(b) which is of the most significance, but section 10(a) and 10(c) will also
be discussed.
a) Section 10(a): the Reasons for Arrest or Detention
The Supreme Court articulated the purpose and content of section 10(a) early on, in the
1991 decision in Evans. The section has two foundations, they held. First, and “most
fundamentally”, they said, “one is not obliged to submit to an arrest if one does not know the
reasons for it.” Second, this right serves as an adjunct to the right to counsel: a person must know
why they are being detained if they are to exercise that right in a meaningful way.45
The impact of section 10(a) is somewhat tempered by the particular conclusion in Evans
and the way the Court approached the issue. In determining whether a person has been told the
reason for the detention in Evans, the Court held that it is “what the accused can reasonably be
supposed to have understood, rather than the formalism of the precise words used, which must
govern.”46 In Evans the accused had been arrested on a drug charge, though the police actually
believed he had information about a murder. They did not initially suspect him of the murder,
though their opinion changed over the course of the interrogation: the issue therefore was
whether section 10(a) was sufficiently complied with in the absence of a specific re-direction to
the accused. Justice Sopinka in dissent argued that the police were required to be as specific in
re-advising the accused of the changed nature of the detention as they had been in telling him he
45
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was detained on drug charges in the first place. The majority of the Court, however, concluded
that the nature of the conversation showed that the accused understood the change in his
jeopardy, and therefore that there was no section 10(a) violation.47 (There was, on the other hand,
a section 10(b) violation, which will be discussed below.)
Other cases can be seen as having diluted to some extent the protection offered by section
10(a). In Latimer, for example, the accused was arguably not fully informed of his
circumstances, because the police had deliberately not arrested him and instead told him that he
was being “detained for investigation”, an option which did not exist in the law at the time.
Despite the false picture presented to the accused, the Court relied on Evans to conclude that
because the accused knew he was in an extremely grave situation with regard to his daughter’s
death, there was no section 10(a) violation.48
Similarly, in Smith the accused was told that he was under arrest for a shooting, but he
was not told that the victim had died. It was conceded before the Supreme Court that this was a
violation of section 10(a), but the Crown argued that the accused’s subsequent waiver of counsel
was valid nonetheless. The Court agreed, holding that the accused had sufficient information to
know the extent of his jeopardy.49
On the other hand, note that the protection offered by section 10(a) is an ongoing one. As
in Evans, it is not uncommon for a person initially to be arrested or detained for one reason, but
for the nature of the detainee’s jeopardy (and therefore the reason for the detention) to change. In
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such circumstances, section 10(a) requires that the detainee be advised of the new reason for the
detention.50
The examples above all relate to section 10(a) rights on arrest. The Court also held, in
creating the power of investigative detention in Mann, that because of section 10(a), “individuals
who are detained for investigative purposes must therefore be advised, in clear and simple
language, of the reasons for the detention.”51
There was a brief period in which some trial courts (particularly in Alberta) took this
statement in Mann to hold police to a stricter standard than Evans had set out: in particular, there
was a line of authority suggesting that drivers who were stopped needed to be explicitly
informed that they were being investigated for a drinking and driving offence.52 Higher courts on
appeal rejected that approach, holding that Mann did not change the rule from Evans that the
relevant question is what the accused can reasonably be supposed to have understood.53 As it was
put in one decision:
In today’s world I find it incomprehensible that anyone who has been drinking and
driving, and has been lawfully detained in the early morning hours and asked to produce
license, registration and proof of insurance, needs to hear the obvious. In such
circumstances it can reasonably be supposed that the driver would understand that he has
been directed to exit his motor vehicle in response to the officer's investigation of that
driver’s sobriety.54
b) Section 10(b): the Right to Counsel
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The contours of the right to counsel in section 10(b) took about a decade to be initially
fleshed out. Those early cases dealt with the right to counsel on arrest, but the Court has
subsequently confirmed that the rights apply equally to those subject to an investigative
detention.55 Since the initial articulation of the right, the case law has been relatively stable.56
Section 10(b) is taken to encompass two sets of duties on the part of the police:
“informational” duties and “implementational” duties. We shall discuss those in turn.
i) Informational Duties
The informational duties simply consist of fully informing the detainee of the content of
the right to counsel. This includes not only telling the detainee that she has the right to contact
counsel, but also informing her of any legal aid or duty counsel programs which exist in the
province,57 and giving information about any 1-800 number for immediate legal advice available
in the province.58
The police are obliged to tell the accused of this information, but in the ordinary case that
is the extent of their obligation: that is, the informational duties do not require them to go further.
The Court has held:
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[A]bsent special circumstances indicating that a detainee may not understand the s. 10(b)
caution, such as language difficulties or a known or obvious mental disability, police are
not required to assure themselves that a detainee fully understands the s. 10(b) caution.59
Note that the informational duties do not impose an obligation on the police to tell the
detainee everything about the right to counsel. For example, a detainee generally has the right to
speak to counsel of choice, but the leading view is that the standard caution need not include the
words “of choice”.60 Similarly, the right to consult counsel includes the right to do so in private,
but there is no clear authority requiring that that particular piece of information be part of the
standard caution.61
One can also see the informational duties as imposing an obligation on the police not to
provide misinformation. In Burlingham the police had made various comments to the accused
over the course of a weekend interrogation aimed at undermining his relationship with counsel.
The Court held:
[Section] 10(b) specifically prohibits the police, as they did in this case, from belittling an
accused's lawyer with the express goal or effect of undermining the accused's confidence
in and relationship with defence counsel. It makes no sense for s. 10(b) of the Charter to
provide for the right to retain and instruct counsel if law enforcement authorities are able
to undermine either an accused's confidence in his or her lawyer or the solicitor-client
relationship.62
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The Supreme Court has also noted that although it is technically possible to waive the
informational components of section 10(b), this will be very rare. A valid waiver depends on the
accused being fully informed of the right she is giving up, and this is unlikely to be the case
where the accused is purporting to waive being given that information in the first place. The
Court has held that there will be a valid waiver of the informational duties only:
[I]f the detainee explicitly waives his or her right to receive the standard caution (for
example, by interrupting the police when they begin to read the caution and telling them
that they do not have to continue) and if the circumstances reveal a reasonable basis for
believing that the detainee in fact knows and has adverted to his rights, and is aware of
the means by which these rights can be exercised. The fact that a detainee merely
indicates that he knows his rights will not, by itself, provide a reasonable basis for
believing that the detainee in fact understands their full extent or the means by which
they can be implemented.63
The Court offers the example of a person who had already received the standard caution
at the beginning of a detention and had spoken to duty counsel but then becomes entitled to be
re-cautioned under section 10(b) as the kind of situation where waiver might be possible.
There is in some cases a further duty arising to provide information, referred to as a
“Prosper warning”. As this can only arise when a detainee purports to waive the
implementational duties, we shall discuss it in that context.
ii) Implementational Duties
These duties consist of things the police are required to do, as opposed to things they are
merely required to tell the accused. A key difference must be noted at the start, which is that
informational duties are triggered by the mere fact of a detention or arrest, but implementational
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duties are only triggered if the accused specifically indicates a desire to contact counsel. The
Court has held that:
[O]nce the police have complied with s. 10(b), by advising the accused without delay of
his right to counsel without delay, there are no correlative duties triggered and cast upon
them until the accused, if he so chooses, has indicated his desire to exercise his right to
counsel.64
The Court has adopted a relatively generous approach to deciding whether an arrestee has
indicated his desire to speak to counsel: an explicit request is not necessary, provided the accused
has in some way expressed an interest.65
There are two implementational duties when the accused indicates a desire to consult
counsel. First, the police must provide the accused with a reasonable opportunity to do so.
Second, the police must cease questioning or otherwise trying to elicit evidence until the accused
has had that reasonable opportunity. The rationale here is that if the right to counsel is to have
any real value, the accused must be able to exercise it before any interrogation or other
investigation involving the accused begins.
Note that the accused is not guaranteed the right to contact counsel – only to a reasonable
opportunity to do so. This is more than the “one phone call” of legend, and police are obliged to
facilitate the accused’s efforts. In Manninen,66 for example, the arrest occurred at a place of
business, and there was a telephone available: the police ought to have offered the accused the
use of that telephone, the Court held, and had no reason to delay the accused’s contact with
counsel until they were back at the police station. Much depends on context, however. The
64
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British Columbia Court of Appeal found no section 10(b) violation in Nelson, where the accused
was not given the chance to consult counsel until nearly two hours after his arrest. The accused
had been arrested at the airport and the delay was attributable to the fact that the police helped
the accused obtain a refund on his ticket and recover his luggage, after which there was about an
hour’s drive to the police station. Since it was not shown that it would have been possible for the
accused to contact counsel privately at the airport, and because the police had not tried to elicit
information during this delay, section 10(b) was complied with.67 Other issues, such as whether
it is immediately possible to facilitate contact with counsel while also ensuring that potentially
violent associates of the accused are not warned, can justify some delay.68 On the other hand, the
general availability of cell phones (a technological development since this case law was
established) is also relevant, sometimes meaning that an accused had an early opportunity to
consult counsel: see the discussion of this issue below under the heading “Unsettled Issues”.
Also treated contextually is the question of counsel of choice. On the one hand, the right
to counsel includes the ability to contact counsel of one’s choice, and early case law has held that
a delay of many hours or until the next day might be reasonable to accommodate that.69 On the
other hand “reasonable” must be assessed in light of the stage of the proceedings and the type of
advice that is needed. So for example an accused who is stopped for a breathalyser is entitled to
consult counsel, and the police have an obligation to hold off from performing that test until the
accused has had a reasonable opportunity to exercise that right: that is, the reasonable
opportunity to consult counsel overrides the two hour time limit within which the breathalyser
must be performed.70 However, all that an accused needs at this stage is initial advice, and so it
might not be “reasonable” to insist on contacting counsel of choice. 71 Generally speaking an
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As early as Ross, supra note 69 the Court observed:

accused must be given a reasonable time to contact counsel of choice but, if that does not
succeed, is expected to obtain legal advice from duty counsel in order to allow the breathalyser
test to proceed. Many cases which rest on their own facts deal with this particular issue, and in
general the assessment of a “reasonable period of time” depends on factors such as the
seriousness of the charge and the urgency of the investigation.72 The prevailing assumption is
that an accused ought to speak with duty counsel. As the Supreme Court recently noted:
If the chosen lawyer cannot be available within a reasonable period of time, detainees are
expected to exercise their right to counsel by calling another lawyer or the police duty to
hold off will be suspended.73
The fact that an arrestee is expected to contact duty counsel takes on particular
significance in light of the fact that the right to counsel is, in essence, “one-shot”. That is, once a
person has had an opportunity to speak with counsel, the obligation on the police to hold off
from attempting to elicit evidence has been satisfied and an interrogation can begin. A detainee
who speaks with duty counsel cannot later insist on being allowed to speak with her counsel of
choice; nor, for that matter, can any detainee who has consulted counsel (or waived the
opportunity to do so) as a matter of course insist on obtaining advice from counsel a further
time.74 Only in certain changed circumstances will the police have an obligation to permit an
additional consultation with counsel. The Court has identified some of those circumstances: the
use of new procedures involving the accused (for example, a line-up75); a change in the jeopardy
facing the accused (for example, the death of an assault victim76); reason to believe that the first
On being arrested, for example, the detained person is faced with an immediate need for legal advice and
must exercise reasonable diligence accordingly. By contrast, when seeking the best lawyer to conduct a
trial, the accused person faces no such immediacy. Nevertheless, accused or detained persons have a right
to choose their counsel and it is only if the lawyer chosen cannot be available within a reasonable time that
the detainee or the accused should be expected to exercise the right to counsel by calling another lawyer.
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information provided was deficient (because, for example, the police have acted to undermine
it77); or offering a plea bargain.78 Revealing evidence to the accused (real or false) is not
sufficient, and the changed circumstances must be objectively observable in order to trigger
additional implementational duties for the police.79 Otherwise, the police are entitled to continue
to ask questions of the arrestee, though of course that person is not required to answer.80
The Court has also, relatively recently, concluded that the right to retain and instruct
counsel in section 10(b) only guarantees the reasonable opportunity to consult counsel before
being interrogated: it does not give a constitutional guarantee of the right to have counsel present
during the interrogation.81
Finally, note that the police are only required to provide the reasonable opportunity to
consult counsel: they are not expected to “look behind” that opportunity and try to assess the
adequacy of that advice. If an accused person speaks with counsel and does not thereafter
“diligently and reasonably” indicate that the advice was inadequate, the police are entitled to
assume that their implementational duty has been satisfied.82 This is the case even if the charge is
serious and the accused has only spoken with counsel for a few minutes.83 At one point there
seemed to be room for the argument that the extreme brevity of advice coupled with other factors
(the age and sophistication of the accused, whether the police were helpful generally, and so on)
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might amount to a section 10(b) violation.84 Since the Court’s recent decisions in the 2010 right
to counsel trilogy, however, that argument is narrowly circumscribed, if it is even possible.85
As will have become apparent, whether the implementational duties have been satisfied is
largely an assessment of the reasonableness of the opportunity given to the arrestee. One aspect
of that question is the behaviour of the arrestee herself: what the case law has referred to as
“reasonable diligence”. It is to that issue we now turn, which is linked with the question of
waiver.
The Court has consistently held that, although it is possible for an accused to waive the
implementational duties, this will only be the case where the waiver is clear and unequivocal and
made by a person who is fully informed of the right he is giving up: the standard for showing
waiver is very high.86 Implied waivers are possible but unlikely, and in particular simply
cooperating with the police investigation (for example by answering the questions asked,
providing a written statement or participating in a line-up on request) will not be a waiver.87
However, it is possible for an accused to lose the benefit of the implementational duties
by not being “reasonably diligent” in exercising the right to counsel, and that possibility is very
much more real than a waiver being found. In Smith, for example, the accused was arrested and
given a phone book to try to contact his lawyer: since it was 9:00 p.m. and only his lawyer’s
office number was in the phone book, the accused indicated that he would wait until the next day
to try to contact him. The Court concluded that the accused had been given a reasonable
opportunity to contact counsel but had not been reasonably diligent in exercising it, and therefore
that there was no violation of section 10(b) when the police began questioning him.
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The final interplay between these two regimes is found in the “Prosper Warning”. It
applies when a detainee has triggered the implementational duties by requesting counsel, has
been reasonably diligent in trying to contact counsel, but has been unsuccessful in doing so. If
that person then indicates an intention to waive section 10(b), a new obligation is imposed on the
police:
At this point, police will be required to tell the detainee of his or her right to a reasonable
opportunity to contact a lawyer and of the obligation on the part of the police during this
time not to take any statements or require the detainee to participate in any potentially
incriminating process until he or she has had that reasonable opportunity. This additional
informational requirement on police ensures that a detainee who persists in wanting to
waive the right to counsel will know what it is that he or she is actually giving up.88
iii) Reasonable Limits on Section 10(b)
In principle, the reasonable limits clause in section 1 applies to section 10(b) as much as
to any other section, and so a prima facie infringement of the right might be saved. As a
practical matter, however, many infringements of section 10(b) arise from a failure to properly
advise the detainee of some aspect of the right or a failure to comply with the implementational
duties. Such infringements will not meet the “prescribed by law” component of section 1, and so
will fail to be saved on that simple basis.
However, there are statutes which explicitly limit the right to counsel.89 In addition, the
limit can arise by “necessary implication from the terms of a statute or regulation or from its
operating requirements”.90 On this basis, statutory limits preventing an accused from having
88
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access to counsel prior to blowing into a roadside screening device or performing roadside
sobriety tests have been found to be saved under section 1.91
c) Section 10(c): the Right to Habeas Corpus
The right in section 10(c) of the Charter differs from that in section (b) in the sense that it
does not create a new right. Habeas corpus, the “Great Writ of Liberty”, was created in the 14th
century as a means of compelling the production of a prisoner and testing whether that detention
was a lawful one.92 What section 10(c) has done is give this pre-existing right constitutional
status.93
The Court has noted that habeas corpus is crucial in the pursuit of two Charter rights: the
protection of liberty in section 7 and the right not to be arbitrarily detained in section 9.94 The
ability to grant habeas corpus is part of the inherent jurisdiction of superior courts,95 and it is not
in principle a discretionary remedy. This point was not always clear in the law, but the Court has
affirmed that “as a matter of general principle, habeas corpus jurisdiction should not be declined
merely because of the existence of an alternative remedy.”96 As a general proposition, then, it is
always open to a person who is detained in some fashion to challenge that detention by way of
habeas corpus.
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However, that right is subject to some restriction in order to prevent collateral attacks on
convictions or other deprivations of liberty. Accordingly, the Court has held, the right to apply
for habeas corpus is subject to two limitations. First, habeas corpus cannot be used to challenge
the legality of a criminal conviction. Appeal rights in those circumstances are fully codified, and
so habeas corpus cannot be used to set up a parallel appeal mechanism.97 Second, “[j]urisdiction
should also be declined where there is in place a complete, comprehensive and expert procedure
for review of an administrative decision.”98 This latter rule has the result that habeas corpus is
not available to challenge immigration decisions.99 However, it remains available with regard to
many other decisions, such as extradition matters,100 security classifications in a penitentiary,101
detention by military forces,102 or detention under a security certificate.103
4. Unsettled Issues
a) Section 9: Trends in Determining Psychological Detention
As noted above, the concept of psychological detention was first postulated by the Court
in their 1985 decision in Therens, but the test for a psychological detention was not created until
the 2009 decision in Grant. That test is a claimant-centred one, looking at whether a reasonable
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person in the individual’s circumstances would conclude that he or she had been deprived by the
state of the liberty of choice, taking into account a number of factors.
Somewhat muddying the water is the decision in Suberu, handed down by the Court on
the same day as Grant. The actual issue in Suberu was whether the section 10(b) right to counsel
is triggered by an investigative detention. The accused had been with another person who was
using a stolen gift card in a liquor store: a police officer arrived at the scene and encountered the
accused who was leaving and saying “he did this, not me, so I guess I can go.” The officer
replied “Wait a minute. I need to talk to you before you go anywhere.” The officer then
followed Suberu outside, where he asked him a half-dozen questions before asking him for his
identification and the registration of the vehicle the accused had gotten into. It was only after the
officer received more information by radio, looked in the vehicle, and concluded that he had
reasonable grounds to arrest the accused that he advised him of his right to counsel.
The Ontario Court of Appeal had concluded that there was no section 10(b) violation on
the basis that that right did not immediately arise when an investigative detention commenced,
and that a short period of delay was permissible. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected that
view, holding that the right to counsel arises immediately upon an investigative detention.
However, they upheld the result in the courts below on the basis that Suberu had not been
detained at all until he was arrested, and therefore his section 10(b) rights did not arise.
This was a surprising conclusion. All the judges at every level below had concluded that
there was a detention: the only argument had been over the legal consequences of that detention.
It was also surprising on the facts. As Justice Binnie in dissent pointed out:
Constable Roughley was replying to Mr. Suberu, who had essentially said, “Can I
leave?”, by essentially saying, “No”.104
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The effect has been to create a kind of sorting mechanism for assessing detentions.
Suberu is being taken to have established the notion of an “exploratory investigation” which does
not amount to a detention, and therefore does not give rise to section 10(b) rights.105 In simple
terms, the approach courts often take now (and the basis upon which counsel frequently argue)
is:
At its simplest, answering the question of whether the defendant was detained depends on
whether the totality of circumstances renders him closer to the fact pattern presented in
Grant or that captured by the facts in Suberu.106
There are patterns which seem to be developing in determining when the line between
“exploratory investigation” and “detention” has been crossed.
To a certain extent these patterns track the factors the Court identified in Grant as
relevant considerations. The Court held, for example, that it would be useful to look at
[t]he circumstances giving rise to the encounter as they would reasonably be perceived by
the individual: whether the police were providing general assistance; maintaining general
order; making general inquiries regarding a particular occurrence; or, singling out the
individual for focussed investigation.107
Cases do frequently try to draw the line between these types of situations. In SA, for
example, a young person was stopped by a police officer who knew him from prior instances
when the officer had found the accused using marijuana. The officer initially asked the accused a
few general questions, such as how he was doing and if he was staying out of trouble. The trial
judge found that the accused was not psychologically detained at this point. At that point,
105
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however, the officer asked “If I were to search you, would I find any weapons or drugs on you?”
The trial judge found that this shift to “a very pointed and self-incriminating question” signalled
the point at which the accused became psychologically detained.108
In SA it was found that there was a psychological detention. However, it is arguable that
the line between “general inquiries regarding a particular occurrence” and “singling out the
individual for focussed investigation” tilts the balance too much toward the side of police
powers. The effect verges on creating a new police power of “pre-investigative detention” based
on less than the reasonable suspicion that the Mann power would require.109
Consider, for example, Bagnato, where the police had been told by an unknown
informant that a person wearing a black baseball cap was selling drugs in the washroom of a
bakery. The officers entered the bakery and observed the accused, who was wearing a black
baseball cap, coming from the washroom area. They approached him and asked him questions,
such as his name, date of birth, and address, as well as telling him they were investigating a
violation of the Trespass to Property Act. The trial judge concluded that in their initial
questioning of the accused they were, in essence, only making general inquiries about the
occurrence, not singling out the accused, and therefore that he was not detained.110
Similarly in Guce the police approached several people because of what they perceived to
be suspicious behaviour on their part giving the officers concern as to whether guns were
present, but these suspicions were not sufficient to constitute “reasonable grounds to suspect” for
an investigative detention. However, the trial judge found the accused not to have been detained
through much of this period because the police were simply engaged in general inquiries.111
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In each of these cases, however, the “general inquiries” amounted to investigating a
possible offence in the absence of a legally-sufficient basis for believing that any offence had
been committed. Neither Bagnato nor Guce simply happened to be people at the scene of an
offence who were included in questioning directed to all witnesses: both were particular targets
of suspicion. To say that there is no Charter violation in such cases is, in effect, to say that the
police are entitled to engage in the behaviour, which amounts to a police power. The only
difference would be that, in the absence of an actual power to detain, the person would have no
obligation to comply with the police demands. In Bagnato, however, it was the very fact that the
accused fled which was taken to give the police reasonable suspicion and the power to detain,112
and in Guce the accused’s evasiveness was taken to justify the kind of focussed questioning
which would otherwise have indicated that he was detained. Once courts begin to reason in that
way, the theoretical difference between “no Charter violation” and “a police power exists”
begins to fade. (See also the further discussion of flight by an accused, below in this section.)
The second set of considerations pointed to in Grant is:
The nature of the police conduct, including the language used; the use of physical
contact; the place where the interaction occurred; the presence of others; and the duration
of the encounter.113
As one would expect none of these factors is necessarily determinative. Certainly some
cases which find that there has been a detention point to what has been said by the police: either
the words used or the aggressive tone in which they are expressed.114 Similarly cases which find
there was no detention might point to the conversational or non-confrontational tone used by
112
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See for example R v Jackman, 2011 NLTD(G) 116 [Jackman], observing at para 46 that the language used by the
officer “was almost immediately intrusive and accusatory.” See also R v Koczab, 2011 MBQB 70 [Koczab], in
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police.115 Nonetheless it can be the case that, because of other factors, a person might be found to
be detained even though in their behaviour the police were polite and non-aggressive.116 This is
of course as it should be: it ought not to be necessary for there to be misbehaviour on the part of
the police before a person is found detained.
Physical contact or barriers can also be important – as one would expect from Grant
itself, where a significant factor was that police officers positioned themselves in a way that
interfered with the path the accused was walking. In Way, for example, the accused was in a
secure room of a police station and was told to knock if she wanted anything: not surprisingly
she was found to be detained.117 In Simard a police car was parked right in front of the accused’s
vehicle, who was again found to be detained.118 The fact that a person’s way is largely blocked
does not necessarily mean that person was detained,119 but many cases, whether finding the
accused psychologically detained or not, have considered the significance of the presence or
absence of such obstacles.120
The length of the detention and whether other people are present tend be weighted fairly
consistently: a brief interaction is much less likely to be found a detention,121 and the presence of
other people also diminishes the likelihood that the person will be found to be detained.122
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The final set of considerations identified by the Court in Grant was:
The particular characteristics or circumstances of the individual where relevant, including
age; physical stature; minority status; level of sophistication.123
The relevance of these factors is illustrated by the facts of Grant itself, where in finding
the accused to be detained the majority noted that he was young, inexperienced, and faced with
three physically larger police officers: he was also black, a point which is noted in the facts but
not referred to by the majority in finding him to be detained.
“Minority status” is something of a problem point in the detention analysis. It is easy to
see how age, physical stature and level of sophistication factor in to a “claimant-centred”
objective analysis: a young person, someone physically smaller than the police, or someone who
has had few dealings with the police could reasonably be expected to be more intimidated and
therefore to reasonably feel unable to leave. No factor is absolutely controlling, of course (a
young person who has had significant dealings with police might objectively not be expected to
feel detained, for example) but the way they ought to factor into the analysis is pretty clear.
That is not so clearly so with minority status, and it has to date played no very significant
role. Some cases have mentioned the fact that an accused is a member of a visible minority but
have not analysed whether it is actually relevant.124 That is similar to the result in Grant, where
the accused’s race is mentioned but not explicitly factored into the detention analysis.
Justice Binnie in his minority judgment in Grant does talk about this point directly. In his
view, the claimant-centred approach of the majority is insufficient because it does not take into
122
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account the perspective of the police: in particular he argued that an intention on the part of the
police to detain someone should be relevant, even if that intention was not apparent to the
individual. In part he argues for that position because of the potentially different position of
visible minorities:
A growing body of evidence and opinion suggests that visible minorities and
marginalized individuals are at particular risk from unjustified “low visibility” police
interventions in their lives: [citations omitted]. The appellant, Mr. Grant, is black. Courts
cannot presume to be colour-blind in these situations.
At the same time, members of visible minorities may, as much as anyone else, be
approached and asked questions by police. While, even more so than others, they may
feel unable to choose to walk away, the perspective of the police and the information (if
any) the police possess when they initiate an encounter would help assess whether the
liberty interest of the person stopped is truly at issue, even if the police perspective on the
encounter is not made known by words or conduct to the person stopped.125
Justice Binnie also observes that a test based solely on how the reasonable person would
react might be inadequate when dealing with visible minorities:
There is, of course, an important continuing role for psychological detention as
perceived by the person stopped, but in that respect serious weight should be given to the
values and experience of the person actually stopped, including the experience of visible
minorities, and less emphasis on the hypothetical opinion of the “reasonable person”
insofar as the latter is presumed to be able to handle such stressful encounters without
sensing “significant . . . psychological restraint” (Mann, at para. 19). As mentioned, Mr.
Grant is black. In determining whether he (or a reasonable person in his position) would
feel free to choose to walk away from three policemen, contrary to their wishes in the
circumstances here, his ethnicity raises a significant issue. As the above-mentioned
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studies show, trial judges differ in the weight they are willing to accord to ethnicity in
such “low visibility” encounters, despite the over-representation of Aboriginals and other
visible minorities in encounters with police patrols. That is why, from my point of view,
the police perspective and the information (if any) the police possessed when they
initiated the encounter is important to shed light on whether or not the liberty interest of
the person stopped was truly compromised.126
This relates to another problem issue with regard to section 9, the issue of racial profiling.
Generally this issue is raised in the context of whether a person’s detention was arbitrary, rather
than whether there was a detention at all, and is the claim that a detention based on race rather
than some proper criterion will violate section 9. That such a stop would be objectionable is
uncontroversial:127 proving that any given stop was an instance of racial profiling has proven
much more difficult. It is certainly an issue that needs to be dealt with by the criminal justice
system, particularly in this context. David Tanovich has argued extensively that police training
programs (imported from the United States) subtly encourage them to make stops based on
race.128
There are other factors which seem to affect the reasoning of judges as to whether a
person was or was not detained. We will discuss two: whether the person was or was not told she
was free to go; and the actions/attitude of the person (in particular whether he tried to flee).

126

Grant, supra note 4 at para 176.

127

See the discussion in footnote 32, above, dealing with Storrey. See also R v Brown (2003), 9 CR (6th) 240, 105
CRR (2d) 132 (Ont CA).
128

David Tanovich has written numerous things that touch on the relationship between the Operation
Pipeline/Convoy/Jetway programs and racial profiling. See David M Tanovich, “Operation Pipeline and Racial
Profiling,” 1 CR (6th) 52, as well as David M Tanovich, “Res Ipsa Loquitur and Racial Profiling” (2002) 46 Crim
LQ 329 at pp. 335-36; David M Tanovich, “E-Racing Racial Profiling” (2004) 41 Alta L Rev 905 at pp. 913-14; and
David M Tanovich, 34 “Using the Charter to Stop Racial Profiling: The Development of an Equality-Based
Conception of Arbitrary Detention” 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 145 (2002) at pp. 151-57. In addition see David M
Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006). See as well David
MacAlister, “The Law Governing Racial Profiling: Implications of Alternative Definitions of the Situation,” (2011)
53 Canadian J Criminology & Crim Just 95 at pp. 99-100; and Tim Quigley, “Brief Investigatory Detentions: A
Critique of R. v. Simpson” (2004) 41 Alta L Rev 935 at pp. 947-48.

Although being told one is free to go was not included in the list of factors to take into
account, it is mentioned elsewhere in Grant.129 The Supreme Court has elsewhere suggested that
such a statement cannot necessarily be taken at face value, but nonetheless it can be a significant
factor.130 Cases where police have continued to ask questions of the individual have been found
not to be a detention if the person has been explicitly told they can leave.131 See for example
Czibulka, where the accused gave a series of statements which were individually analysed for
admissibility. There was some dispute over whether he was detained at the time of statement
four, since he was in a police station and had not been told he was free to leave before that point:
however, he was subsequently told he was free to leave and chose to stay, and the defence
conceded that he was not detained at the time of statements five and six.132
On the other hand in Jackman the accused was told he was free to leave, but in the same
breath the officer continued to ask questions and had his arm on or close to the car’s window
ledge: the trial judge found that the accused was in fact detained.133 However, some drivers told
they could go have been found not detained even if the officer continues to have her hands or
head inside the window of the vehicle.134
The other issue sometimes taken to be relevant is how the accused behaved, and in
particular that he attempted to leave or did leave. In Brown, for example, the police activated
their lights to signal to the accused that he should stop: in fact he sped away and (after a
collision) fled on foot, eventually being tackled by private citizens after a struggle with police
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officers. The trial judge held that the accused was not detained until he was finally subdued by
the private citizens. More than just that, she concluded that Grant meant “that there can be no
psychological detention, unless there is compliance with the police command.”135 This approach
is consistent with some pre-Grant case law, such as the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in
Nesbeth, holding that compliance with a police demand is an essential aspect of psychological
detention.136
On the one hand there is some intuitive appeal to the notion that a person who does not
comply is not psychologically detained: a person who is fleeing can hardly be said to be detained
at all, psychologically or otherwise.137 Further, that a reasonable person in the circumstances did
not feel obliged to comply might be the reasonable conclusion to draw on particular facts. If a
person was among a group to whom questions were being directed, and at some point began to
wander away, very likely the right conclusion is that the person felt no compulsion to stay and so
was not psychologically detained.
On the other hand, to deny that detention is ever possible when the accused flees is to
deny access to a Charter claim where one might be appropriate. Brown argued, for example, that
the police were attempting to stop him without legitimate reason: that had he stopped it would
have been an arbitrary detention. To deny that the circumstances could ever amount to a
detention is to prevent such a Charter claim from ever being assessed on the more important
ground of whether it was authorized by law or not.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal in Reddy, for example, were faced with an
accused who fled from the police, but they nonetheless found a section 9 violation because he
was subjected to an investigative detention in the absence of reasonable suspicion.138 In that case,
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though, the accused had briefly complied with police demands, by getting out of a vehicle and
standing where he was directed: it was only after that point at which he fled. The Court of
Appeal pinned their finding of detention on the period of brief compliance, but it did give them
grounds to assess the validity of the demand.
The law in this area is not yet entirely satisfactory. First of all, even on a subjective view,
a person who flees from a police siren is probably not unaware of the obligation to stop: rather,
she is very likely thinking “I am obliged to stop but I am not going to”. That is not fundamentally
different from an accused who breaks free of an officer’s grip and flees, and such a person would
be entitled to have the legality of their detention tested. Further, one might question whether the
decisions to date focus too much on the subjective perspective of the accused, rather than
adopting the objective view the Grant test requires. When we approach it from an objective
perspective, surely the conclusion a reasonable person would draw from seeing flashing police
lights behind one’s car (or hearing the words “Stop, police”, as in Nesbeth) would be that he is
obliged to stop: the fact that the accused personally does not stop is not the issue.139
Some decisions seem to apply this same reasoning to a person who refuses to answer
questions, holding that that implies the person was not detained.140 Other cases, however,
distinguish flight from refusal to answer questions, which seems appropriate.141 The Supreme
Court in Mann did specifically note that a person who is subject to an investigative detention has
no obligation to answer questions:142 to use that refusal as a means of saying the person was not
detained would simply be a means of removing them from the protection of the Charter.
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b) Section 9: “Unlawful” Equals “Arbitrary”
It is not really accurate to describe this as an unsettled issue: although the point was left
open for many years, the Court consciously and authoritatively determined in Grant that a
detention which was not lawful was by definition arbitrary under section 9. The reason the issue
is included here is that although that point has been settled, a significant number of lower courts
have not yet recognised that fact.
The difficulty is that although the Supreme Court had left the issue open, the leading
authority at the Court of Appeal level, Duguay, had held that, “[i]t cannot be that every unlawful
arrest necessarily falls within the words ‘arbitrarily detained’”.143 Although Grant explicitly
overruled that point, Duguay continues to be cited.
For the most part the message does appear to have gotten through. There are many ways
in which there could be a failure to comply with statutory requirements in the arrest context, for
example. An arrest must comply with the requirements of the Criminal Code.144 Following an
arrest the arresting officer and the officer in charge both have a statutory obligation to release the
accused if certain conditions do not apply.145 If there is no release at that stage, police are
required to take the arrestee before a justice of the peace without unreasonable delay and in any
event within twenty-four hours.146
In the latter two contexts, case law since Grant quite consistently relies on the correct
test, and finds that a detention is arbitrary or not depending on whether the statutory
requirements were met.147 Many cases are equally doing so in the arrest context: an interesting
143
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example is Cunsolo, which was still in the system when Grant was decided. At a pre-trial
hearing (which pre-dated Grant) it had been found that the accused had been unlawfully arrested
but that this did not amount to a violation of his section 9 right. Following Grant the matter was
re-argued and it was found that, because the arrest was unlawful, it was arbitrary and violated
section 9.148 Many other arrest cases are also taking into account Grant’s change to the legal
landscape.149
However, in many instances involving the arrest power, Duguay continues to be cited by
trial judges as the governing authority.150 In some cases this made no difference to the final
result: for example, where a judge found that something more than mere illegality would have
been necessary for a section 9 violation but then either finds the arrest to have been lawful, or
finds that there was more than mere illegality. In those cases, of course, the courts are reasoning
incorrectly: a finding of illegality should be sufficient to settle the section 9 issue. Further, in
some instances this error does affect the reasoning,151 and one hopes that in a relatively short
time the correct current state of the law will be universally recognized.
c) Section 10: Right to Counsel
As was noted in discussing section 10(b), the general parameters of the right to counsel –
when it is available and what it entails – were settled in the early years of the Charter and little
has changed since. There are two issues which might be considered unsettled, however.
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The first need only be discussed briefly: whether the rights on arrest arise in the case of a
private citizen’s arrest. One might reasonably be surprised that there is no definitive answer to
this question after 30 years of Charter jurisprudence. The issue has not reached the Supreme
Court152 and there is not a clear consensus in lower courts. There is authority each way, and other
cases have finessed the issue by concluding that no Charter rights arose on the facts.153 No doubt
the issue will eventually reach the Supreme Court, but in the meantime it seems to be an issue
which has been left unsettled without great inconvenience thereby being caused.154
The second issue to be noted is the availability of the right to counsel in the particular
context of roadside screening demands. The law itself is not particularly in doubt, but the
application of the law is the most active area of section 10(b) litigation today.
Two early cases dealt with section 10(b) and breath demands: Therens and Thomsen.155
Therens dealt with a breathalyser demand, a procedure which would require the accused to return
to the police station and provide two samples within a two hour period, while Thomsen dealt
with an approved screening device (ASD), a simpler instrument which could be administered at
the roadside. In the case of either demand, the Court held, an accused was detained and so
section 10(b) was engaged. In the case of the former, the accused was entitled to consult with
counsel, but in the case of the latter, a denial of section 10(b) rights was found to be justified
under section 1. This result hinged on whether the infringement in each case was “prescribed by
law”, as required by section 1. In the case of the breathalyser provision, nothing in the statute
purported to remove the right to counsel, and so section 1 could not apply. In the case of the
ASD demand, however, the provision required that the test be done “forthwith”. That meant the
152
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statute required that the test be done immediately or without delay, which amounted to implicitly
prescribing by law that the accused was not first entitled to consult counsel.
Clearly in the background of this reasoning was the technological reality of the mid
1980s: an accused taken to a police station would have access to a telephone but an accused on
the side of the road would not. Equally clearly, that rationale is no longer true. The effect has
been to create unsettledness with regard to the right to counsel and ASD demands. That is,
Thomsen seemed to settle that no right to counsel was available in the case of an ASD demand,
but considerable litigation now takes place – often successfully – seeking exactly that right. That
is, the rule in Thomsen156 is still good law but it is no longer categorical.
The route by which courts are reaching this conclusion is quite interesting. One might
expect that, given the current relative ease of calling counsel from the roadside, the limit on the
right to counsel now fails the Oakes test for section 1: that it is not a reasonable limit because
denying the opportunity is no longer rationally connected to the goal of performing the test, or
that it is not minimally impairing, for example. In fact that is not the approach being taken.157
Rather, the fact that there was time for the accused to contact counsel is being taken as a
means of demonstrating that the ASD procedure was not being performed in accordance with the
statutory requirement: if there would have been time for the accused to contact counsel, then the
test was not in fact performed “forthwith”. If the “forthwith” requirement was not met, then the
demand was not in accordance with the statutory provision and so the limitation on section 10(b)
was not “prescribed by law”. In that event it could not be saved under section 1.
In fact this rationale predates the widespread use of cell phones, though that technology
has made the circumstances in which it is relevant more common. As the Ontario Court of
Appeal held in Latour in 1997:
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[I]n order for the demand to be made pursuant to a valid statutory provision, it must be
one to provide a sample of breath in circumstances such that no reasonable opportunity
for contact with counsel can be made. Otherwise, the demand is outside the
constitutionally permissible boundaries of the legislation and is invalid. The meaning of
the word “forthwith” must therefore be defined in terms consonant with the outside limit
on the limitation to the right to counsel.
[…]
The determinative question then becomes in any given case, was the police officer
in a position to require that a breath sample be provided by the accused before any
realistic opportunity to consult counsel? If so, the demand, if otherwise appropriate, falls
within the scope of s. 254(2). If not, the demand is not valid.158
As one would expect, the actual amount of time until the test is performed is relevant to
whether it took place “forthwith”. However, since having the opportunity to consult with counsel
is taken to demonstrate that the test was not forthwith, many other factors – whether the accused
is carrying a cell phone, the time of day, whether the accused actually was able to reach counsel
later and how easily, and so on – have also been found to be relevant.159 These factors are out of
the hands of the police – unlike, for example, whether the officer has an ASD with her or needs
to have one brought from a nearby station – and yet they affect the decision as to whether the test
was performed in accordance with the statutory requirement.
It should be noted that the question is not merely whether there was time for the accused
to contact counsel: to “consult” requires contacting, seeking, and receiving advice from
counsel.160 Note as well that “there was time to consult counsel” is not the sole possible criterion
158
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for assessing whether the test took place forthwith: that is, a test might fail to be forthwith for
other reasons as well.161
B. Pre-Trial and Trial (and some Post-Trial) Stage Rights: Section 11
1. Introduction
As with sections 9 and 10, section 11 also seeks to mediate the balance between the
state’s coercive power to enforce the criminal law and the right of the individual to be free from
unnecessarily intrusive exertions of that power. It does so in essentially three ways: 1) imposing
duties on the state, such as to inform the accused of the charged offence without unreasonable
delay (s. 11(a)) or to try the accused within a reasonable time (s. 11(b)); 2) disentitling the state
from certain “benefits”, such as the ability to incriminate the accused with his own testimony (s.
11(c)); and 3) by erecting explicit protections for the individual, as with the presumption of
innocence in s. 11(d).
The title, “Proceedings in criminal and penal matters,” seems to indicate a fairly broad
procedural and temporal scope, and in fact the various provisions of section 11 cover one aspect
of what might be thought of as the investigative stage – the laying of the charge under paragraph
(a) – and then continue on throughout the pre-trial, trial and even post-trial stages. Perhaps this
was to be expected, since it is clear that the “Legal Rights” portion of the Charter overall was
not intended by the framers to contain (for lack of a less hackneyed term) watertight
compartments. As discussed below, paragraph 11(c) clearly interacts with s. 13, since both
concern trial testimony; section 14’s interpretation rights pertain to trial testimony by an accused
and yet are the subject of a stand-alone section; and paragraph 11(i) and s. 12 both deal with
sentencing. Moreover, as discussed in a previous chapter of this volume, the Supreme Court has
interpreted section 7 to contain the basic template of legal rights from which others (including
those in s. 11) flow.

161

R v Quansah, 2012 ONCA 123.

It is interesting to note that the s. 11 rights can be thought of as having emerged from two
baskets, one of rights that existed in the common law or at least reflected the usual practice and
were simply being codified, and the other of rights that were more aspirational. As will be seen,
the presence or lack of a common law heritage has sometimes shaped the application and
interpretation of these rights by the courts.
2. “Charged with an offence”
The rights in s. 11 are triggered when a person (including a corporation) has been charged
with an offence. This has required attention to the meaning of “charged” and “offence,” though
both are now reasonably well-settled. In R v Kalanj Justice MacIntyre held for the majority that
“a person is ‘charged with an offence’ within the meaning of s. 11 when an information is sworn
alleging an offence against him, or where a direct indictment is laid against him when no
information is sworn.”162 The minority position, that a “charge” for this purpose occurred when
the individual felt the impact of the criminal process, i.e. through arrest, service of process, etc.,
has not gained any traction.163 The Court had earlier held that there is no charge when the Crown
makes an application to have a convicted person declared a dangerous offender, as this is
correctly characterized as part of the sentencing proceedings,164 and that the issuance of an
injunction against picketing does not constitute a “charge” even where it is based on the criminal
contempt of the picketers.165
On the issue of what constitutes an “offence” for the purposes of s. 11, the leading
authority is still the Supreme Court of Canada’s 1987 decision in R v Wigglesworth.166 The
accused was a police officer who had assaulted a prisoner during an interrogation, and had been
convicted and fined by a police tribunal of a “major service offence” under the RCMP Act. In
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affirming that s. 11 applied to this sort of proceeding, Justice Wilson for the court noted that the
s. 11 rights “are available to persons prosecuted by the state for public offences involving
punitive sanctions, i.e., criminal, quasi-criminal and regulatory offences, either federally or
provincially enacted.”167 This applied irrespective of penalty, even a slight fine arising from a
traffic ticket.168
In terms of evaluating whether a particular provision constituted the kind of legislation
which would attract s. 11 protection, the Court formulated two tests. The first, the “by nature”
test, would be satisfied by offences of “a public nature, intended to promote public order and
welfare within a sphere of public activity,” but not by “private, domestic or disciplinary matters
which are regulatory, protective or corrective and which are primarily intended to maintain
discipline, professional integrity and professional standards or to regulate conduct within a
limited private sphere of activity.”169 While this included a fairly broad range of offences,
Wigglesworth’s case involved an offence that fell into the latter class of regulatory or
disciplinary matters. However, the Court ruled that even such matters would attract s. 11 if they
involved “true penal consequences,” which included imprisonment and fines which were
“punitive” in the sense that they were imposed for redressing the wrong done to the public rather
than for internal purposes.170 In this case, while standard RCMP internal discipline procedures
did not qualify, major service offences attracted a maximum penalty of one year’s imprisonment
and thus fell into the “true penal consequence” category.
For the most part, professional171 or police disciplinary proceedings do not meet either of
the tests,172 nor do prison disciplinary proceedings,173 nor do forfeiture proceedings based on
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false statements allegedly made in breach of the Customs Act.174 Court Martial proceedings
under the National Defence Act, on the other hand, were ruled to meet both of the Wigglesworth
tests, given that military courts served the same purpose and administered some of the same law
as regular criminal courts and the tribunals could impose custodial sentences.175
In extradition proceedings, the Supreme Court held in Canada v Schmidt176 that the
notion of “charged” was territorially limited, so that even though a person sought for extradition
was likely to have been charged in some sense177 by the requesting state, the foreign proceedings
did not attract Charter protection. This accords with the Court’s other findings that the Charter
does not apply extraterritorially to the acts of foreign officials generally.178 However, it bumps
up uneasily against a 2004 decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal179 which held that
an individual was entitled to a disclosure remedy under section 7 of the Charter because his right
to full answer and defence was threatened – even though he was facing trial in Florida.180
3. Specific Paragraphs
a) Paragraph (a): “to be informed without unreasonable delay of the specific offence”
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The remedy was justified on the basis that the Florida charges had resulted from a cooperative investigation
between US police and the RCMP, the latter having gathered evidence about the accused in B.C. which was
transmitted to American authorities.

The s. 11(a) right emerged from the common law,181 and is also expressed in statutory
provisions such as the current s. 581 of the Criminal Code, where “a statement that the accused
or defendant committed an offence” must be “in popular language without technical averments”
or “in words that are sufficient to give to the accused notice of the offence with which he is
charged.” This accords with the specificity requirement now constitutionalized by s. 11(a).
A pair of early Nova Scotia Court of Appeal decisions nicely bookend what “specific”
means in this context: in R v Goreham,182 the Court held that “any concise expression which
sufficiently describes the offence to the accused” will comport with the requirement, while in R v
Lucas183 an information which simply described the offence as “operating overweight vehicle”
did not provide the requisite specificity because the relevant regulations provided several ways in
which the offence could arise. The power of a preliminary inquiry judge to commit a person for
trial for other offences arising from the same conduct as the charged act has been held not to
violate s. 11(a),184 and one court has ruled that the accused is not entitled to be informed as to
whether, in the case of a hybrid offence, the Crown is proceeding by way of indictment or
summary conviction.185
As to defining “unreasonable delay,” the focus has naturally been on any time which
elapses between the laying of the charge and the accused being informed of the charge. The
leading authority is still R v Delaronde,186 in which the Supreme Court of Canada accepted the
Quebec Court of Appeal’s view that this temporal delay is only “unreasonable” if it affects the
prospects for a fair trial. The Court of Appeal had raised a number of other factors to be
considered, including the length of the delay, whether the accused had contributed to the delay
181
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(including the unlikely scenario that the accused’s conduct could amount to waiver of a
reasonable time period), the actions of the Crown and whether the delay could be attributable to
police conduct, the limits on institutional resources in terms of finding the accused. However,
even though all of these factors ran in the accused’s favour in Delaronde, the lack of prejudice to
his chances for a fair trial meant that the delay was not unreasonable.
The Delaronde ruling has had the effect of narrowing the potential scope of the
protection187 and the situations in which a successful s. 11(a) challenge can be made are
unusual.188
b) Paragraph (b): “to be tried within a reasonable time”
The right to trial within a reasonable time had no real pedigree in Canadian law beyond
scattered time limitations in the Criminal Code.189 Nonetheless, its policy rationale is clear:
“speedy trials serve the interests of everyone involved in the criminal justice process, including
the accused and society at large.”190 The s. 11(b) right protects both the accused, by holding
down the stigma and stress of prosecution as well as the liberty restrictions stemming from pretrial detention; and society, by ensuring that justice is done and done in a timely manner.191
However, the section has also attracted significant litigation and public attention, due in no small
part to the starkness of the minimum remedy when a breach is found – a stay of proceedings.192
Moreover, as Professor Stuart has astutely observed:
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The 11(b) challenge may also be the most politically charged since the Court’s
constitutional duty to assess court delay necessarily involves the judiciary in
direct assessment of administrative and political decisions as to the deployment
of scarce public resources.193
The fundamental question for assessing the s. 11(b) protection is one of delay –
specifically the delay between the accused being charged and the end of the trial,194 and since
“some delay is inevitable […] at what point does the delay become unreasonable?”195 It was not
immediately clear whether the time period being considered as against a standard of
reasonableness was the entire time from the laying of the charge to the end of the trial, or
whether what should be considered was the portion of that time which was longer than should
have been expected. The Supreme Court has been clear that the former meaning was the correct
one, though recent case law from Ontario has oddly gone with the latter meaning, the effect of
which has been to uphold cases with far longer delays than the governing jurisprudence would
seem to countenance.196
The test for whether a delay is reasonable has had a troubled history, emerging first in the
cases of R v Smith197 and R v Askov,198 and refined to its current form in the Court’s 1992
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decision in R v Morin.199 It requires the discretionary balancing of four factors: “(1) the length of
the delay; (2) waiver of time periods; (3) the reasons for the delay, including (a) inherent time
requirements of the case, (b) actions of the accused, (c) actions of the Crown, (d) limits on
institutional resources, and (e) any other reasons for delay; and (4) prejudice to the accused.”200
The overall goal was clearly twofold: to have a template allowing a nuanced appreciation of each
case’s factual matrix regarding why particular delays had occurred; and to ensure that delays
caused by the Crown would be counted against the Crown and weigh in favour of a remedy,
while delays caused or contributed to by the accused would not be considered as part of the
“unreasonable” measure for constitutional purposes.201
In Askov the Court suggested a guideline of six to eight months delay from the time of
committal to the start of a trial, which famously led to over 47,000 charges being withdrawn by
the Ontario Crown alone. The Court appeared to wish to retract in Morin, suggesting that delay
in provincial courts should be between eight and ten months, and emphasizing that the Askov
“guidelines” were simply that and not to be considered limitation periods. It observed:
The purpose in expressing a guideline is two-fold. First […] it is to recognize
that there is a limit to the delay that can be tolerated on account of [Crown]
resource limitations. Second, it is to avoid each application pursuant to s. 11(b)
being turned into a trial of the budgetary policy of the government as it relates
to the administration of justice.202
Of course, Morin was released in 1992, and as is well known conditions on the ground
have changed significantly for the worse in terms of delay. There has been a notable trend among
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the Ontario courts, at least, over the last several years: while the Supreme Court’s caution not to
treat the Morin guidelines as a fixed ceiling has been respected formally, there has nonetheless
been some firming up of the guidelines and less tolerance for departures. A much cited decision
of this sort was that of Justice Nordheimer in the 2007 case of R v Osei,203 where the Crown
argued that the delay outside the guidelines which was attributable to it (5-9 months) was “not
excessive.” Justice Nordheimer memorably expressed a certain amount of exasperation:
To some degree, however, that submission misses the fundamental point. The
guidelines were established to give some fairly clear direction to government as
to what constitutes the outer limits of tolerable delay in the justice system.
Governments have now had many years to adjust their priorities in order to
ensure that the justice system receives sufficient resources to match their results
against these guidelines. Indeed, I would note that the Supreme Court of Canada
observed that, as time passed, it expected that cases would have to conform to
the lower end of the guidelines. [….]
Whether that is a fair expectation or not, in responding to the basic submission
that the Crown has not missed the mark by much, I will repeat the essence of
what I said in an earlier case. If the guidelines set out by the Supreme Court of
Canada are to have any meaning and impact, cases cannot be routinely excused
from compliance on the basis that the Crown got pretty close to complying. To
conclude otherwise is to then excuse the Crown from compliance with these
constitutionally mandated requirements except when its failure results in
especially egregious delay. That result would, in turn, mean that the Crown
would not have to concern itself with its obligation to ensure that all cases
conform to the guidelines but would only have to concern itself with an abject
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failure to comply. That cannot be an acceptable result when we speak of
fundamental rights such as those enshrined in Section 11(b) of the Charter.204
The most significant aspect of these cases, and indeed the s. 11(b) issue with the most
current traction, has been how the notion of prejudice to the accused’s interests enters into and is
used within the exercise. In the earlier case law stemming from the Lamer Court, the dominant
theme was that meaningful prejudice to the accused stemmed automatically from the fact of
delay, and thus the accused (while having to prove the s. 11(b) breach overall) was not required
to demonstrate specific prejudice to make out the breach. Prejudice was presumed. On the other
hand, the Court was not opposed to the admission of evidence of prejudice, which of course
would be relevant chiefly to fair trial rights or liberty interests but also seemed to be capable of
buttressing a s. 11(b) claim.
In Morin, however, the Court seemed to shrink if not eliminate the presumption of
prejudice, by allowing the Crown to disprove prejudice by showing “that the accused is in the
majority group who do not want an early trial and that the delay benefitted rather than prejudiced
the accused.”205 The result was a more restrictive approach where the courts assessed the
presence or absence of prejudice based on the accused’s ability (or lack thereof) to show
prejudice caused by the delay. This was a far cry from the earlier ruling in Smith that “‘a criminal
charge will be hanging over [the accused] for a substantial period of time.’ This is the very
essence of prejudice to the security interests of a person charged with an offence.”206
The result of Morin was to make s. 11(b) challenges very unlikely to succeed for well
over a decade,207 but over the same period the average time required for cases to conclude had
204
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increased dramatically.208 The Supreme Court responded in 2009 with its unanimous decision in
R. v. Godin,209 written by Cromwell J., which while not overturning Morin seemed to indicate an
attitudinal shift. Godin involved a 30-month delay in a relatively straightforward case, where
most of the delay was attributable to (but not explained by) the Crown. The Ontario Court of
Appeal had overturned the trial judge’s issuance of a stay, applying the Morin emphasis on
specific sources of prejudice resulting from the delay. Justice Cromwell restored the stay,
reiterating that “prejudice may be inferred from the length of the delay. The longer the delay the
more likely that such an inference will be drawn.”210 Demonstrated prejudice to the accused’s
security of the person, liberty and fair trial interests were all relevant, but the absence of
demonstrated prejudice was not conclusive – the fact of charges having been hanging over his
head and having had bail conditions imposed were, by themselves, prejudicial.
A review of the post-Godin case law indicates that, thus far, Godin has begun to have
what may have been the Court’s desired effect: to make the absence of demonstrated prejudice
less significant and breathe a more robust life into the s. 11(b) protection. There are only a very
few cases which simply ground the remedy on an inference of prejudice arising from the length
of the delay involved, one of which is R v Palmer,211 where the accused were charged with
robbery and then faced a 43-month delay until their trial date. The court cited Godin in inferring
that the lengthy delay was prejudicial, stating “[i]t is not necessary to demonstrate actual
prejudice, even with respect to the ability to provide full answer and defence.”212
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More common, however, have been cases where the courts have given the “inferred
prejudice” significant weight – citing and obviously comforted by Godin in so doing – but also
rely on the array of other factors that underpinned the Morin caselaw, such as effects on the
accused’s ability to make full answer and defence or facing unusual amounts of stigma. For
example, in R v Ross,213 the accused made a s. 11(b) motion based on a delay of 21 months and
the court indicated that he did “not have to demonstrate actual prejudice in order for the Court to
conclude that he [had], by virtue of the period of delay, suffered a prejudice.”214 However, it also
invoked prejudice to his ability to lead evidence and cross-examine witnesses while their
memories were fresh.215 The trend is not universal and there is certainly case law indicating that
some courts remain mired in the pre-Godin calculus.216
However, there is reason to believe that the Court’s attempt to restore the balance in
Godin will be successful in the longer term. In R v Steele,217 the trial judge had relied on
evidence of actual prejudice in declining to issue a stay. The Court of Appeal reversed, invoking
Godin’s instruction regarding inferred prejudice and holding that because the trial judge “failed
to take into account inferred prejudice, his balancing was unreasonably skewed in favour of the
genuine public interest in a trial on the merits.”218
c) Paragraph (c): “not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings against that person in
respect of the offence”
While its origins are in the common law, paragraph 11(c) is part of an overall spectrum
(or, less flatteringly, a “mishmash”219) of protections that reflects a broader principle against selfincrimination which, as Professor Dufraimont has noted, “operates as a unifying theme linking a
213
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disparate set of procedural and evidentiary rules.”220 The Supreme Court has held that the
broader principle against self-incrimination “may demand different things at different times”221
and paragraph 11(c) is where it demands the most, and most formally. It is, of course, directly
concerned with the accused’s entitlement to refuse to participate in creating the case against
him/her, and the law’s post-Star Chamber abhorrence at such compulsion.
This particular aspect of the principle against self-incrimination is founded in the
common law rule that the accused is not a compellable witness for the Crown, which was
preserved even when the 1893 Canada Evidence Act’s version of what is now s. 4(1) of that Act
made the accused a competent witness for the first time, though only for the defence. The s.
11(c) protection is obviously related to, but practically distinct from, s. 13’s protection against a
witness’s testimony in an earlier proceeding being used to incriminate that witness in
proceedings against him/her. The Supreme Court has characterized section 11(c) as providing
“direct” protection and s. 13’s protection as being “indirect.”222
The accused, then, cannot be compelled by the Crown to testify in criminal proceedings
against him/her. This protection is related to the presumption of innocence in section 11(d) (see
below), and adds teeth to the accused’s entitlement to “stand mute”223 and hold the Crown to its
burden of proving the case against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Naturally, an
effective Crown case will sometimes put pressure on the accused to take the stand in her own
defence, but this is a “tactical burden”224 with the choice left in the accused’s hands.
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However robust the protection, however, the application of s. 11(c) itself was quickly
confined by the courts to apply only “against testimonial compulsion and nothing else.”225 While
the accused cannot be compelled to testify at his trial or preliminary inquiry,226 the protection
does not apply against breath samples compelled under the Criminal Code,227 questioning by
police,228 fingerprinting229 or the various compulsions involved in an accused’s motion to obtain
access to the prior sexual history of a complainant in sexual assault cases.230 In cases where two
co-accused have been charged with the same offence but are being tried separately, the s. 11(c)
protection does not protect one accused from being compelled to testify at the other’s trial231 or
preliminary inquiry,232 nor against compulsion “where the witness had previously been charged
with the same offence as the accused but the proceedings had been stayed, or where the accused
is charged with being an accessory after the fact.”233 It is also clear that s. 11(c) is one of the
protections which cannot be relied upon by a corporation, as it cannot “be a witness.”234
Another important aspect of s. 11(c) is that, as the Supreme Court has found, it is
functionally part of the accused’s overall right to silence that arises from s. 7. From early Charter
days the Supreme Court determined that it was vital that neither the accused’s protection against
compulsion to testify nor her choice not to testify be used to buttress the case against her. This
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had, in fact, been the intention behind what is now s. 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act, which
states: “The failure of the person charged […] to testify shall not be made the subject of
comment by the judge or by the counsel for the prosecution.” As Justice Ritchie observed in the
pre-Charter case of R v McConnell, s. 4(6) “was enacted for the protection of accused persons
against the danger of having their right not to testify presented to the jury in such fashion as to
suggest that their silence is being used as a cloak for their guilt.”235
However, litigation around this aspect of the 11(c) protection has been contentious,
stemming primarily from the Supreme Court’s decision in R v Noble.236 In that case, the majority
of the Court held that the accused’s decision not to testify in his own trial could not be the
subject of an adverse inference against him and the lack of testimony (i.e. explanation) from the
accused could not be treated as evidence of his guilt. The contention stemmed not from this
finding but from its uneasy interaction with s. 4(6) of the CEA. In Noble Justice Sopinka for the
majority ruled that the wording of s. 4(6) meant that the judge and Crown could not make any
comment whatsoever, even to provide an instruction to the jury that they must not use the
accused’s silence against him. Since this left open the possibility that the jury might do the exact
thing that was prohibited, without any assistance from the trial judge, it was criticized as being
unconstitutional.237
The Court provided clarification in the recent case of R v Profokiew.238 In this case
counsel for one co-accused had, in summation, suggested to the jury that they could infer the
guilt of the other co-accused from the latter’s failure to testify. The trial judge recognized the
impropriety of the comment and that it created a “significant risk”239 that the jury would misuse
the accused’s silence. However, he held (on the authority of Noble, inter alia) that he could not
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give the jury a specific instruction on the matter. A unanimous 5-member bench of the Ontario
Court of Appeal held that s. 4(6) did allow a trial judge to instruct the jury that they could not use
the accused’s failure to testify to incriminate him, but that the standard jury instruction used by
the trial judge would have made the jury aware of this.
The Supreme Court split 5-4, the majority upholding the ruling of the Ontario Court of
Appeal. The entire Court agreed that a purposive reading of s. 4(6) permitted trial judges to
instruct the jury on the matter and that what it actually prohibited was any comment which might
be prejudicial to the accused’s case; Sopinka J.’s remarks in the earlier case law were dismissed
as obiter dicta.240 Comments to the effect that the co-accused “had nothing to hide” and that his
evidence stood uncontradicted were acceptable, but counsel was not permitted to mislead the
jury on such an important point of law.
The Court split on whether an instruction had been necessary in this case. Justice
Moldaver for the majority conceded that an instruction would have been warranted and
preferable in the situation, but was not required because the trial judge’s overall instructions to
the jury contained appropriate language regarding the burden of proof and emphasis on the
accused’s entitlement to stand silent. Writing for himself, McLachlin C.J., LeBel and Cromwell
JJ., Justice Fish in dissent emphasized the trial judge’s finding that the comments by the coaccused’s counsel “cried out for an explicit remedial instruction,”241 but no instruction was given
because the trial judge felt himself bound by the law not to give one. In any situation where there
was a “significant risk” of misuse, an instruction was required. The jurors here “were left free to
treat Mr. Prokofiew’s failure to testify as evidence of his guilt and to convict him, at least in part,
for that reason,”242 which was fatal to the verdict.
The disagreement between the majority and minority essentially turns on whether the jury
instructions that were given effectively conveyed to the jury that they were not to use the
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accused’s failure to testify against him. While the majority relied on the careful analysis of the
instructions by Justice Doherty in the court below to find in the affirmative, the dissenting judges
compellingly note that these were nonetheless “standard instructions” which were not sufficient
– “particularly […] where, as here, counsel for one accused has suggested unmistakably to the
jury that the guilt of a co-accused may be inferred from that person’s failure to testify.”243 In our
view, if a set of standard jury instructions are enough to correct a “significant” potential for jury
misuse, s. 4(6) as a specific application of s. 11(c) of the Charter may become merely a shell of a
protection for the accused.
d) “to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal”
As has been recently commented, s. 11(d) is a “complex Charter right” which has “had a
significant impact on the practice of criminal law over the past three decades.”244 The case law is
so varied and complex that the best course here is to break down consideration of the paragraph
into its constituent parts.
i) Presumption of Innocence
The presumption of innocence has a significant historical pedigree and is, in many
senses, the backbone of the common law approach to administering the criminal law. The House
of Lords’ timeless and resounding words in Woolmington v D.P.P. still reverberate in Canadian
criminal law today: “Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is
always to be seen, that is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt […] and no
attempt to whittle it down can be entertained.”245 In a recent and significant decision on the
243
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application of s. 11(d), Justice Cromwell nicely summed up the manner in which the
presumption of innocence has been applied in Charter times:
The presumption of innocence, guaranteed by s. 11(d) of the Charter, is
fundamental to our understanding of the criminal process. As Cory J. put it
in R. v. Lifchus, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320, at para. 27: “If the presumption of
innocence is the golden thread of criminal justice then proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is the silver and these two threads are forever intertwined in
the fabric of criminal law.”
From the time of this Court’s first pronouncements, the presumption of
innocence has been understood as having three elements. First, the Crown
bears the burden of proving the accused’s guilt; second, the standard of proof
required is proof beyond a reasonable doubt; and third, the Crown has the
obligation of making out a case to answer against the accused before he or she
need respond, either by testifying or by calling evidence: see Dubois v. The
Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 350, at p. 357. Laskin J. concisely summed up these
requirements in R. v. Appleby, [1972] S.C.R. 303, at p. 317: “[T]he
presumption of innocence gives an accused the initial benefit of a right of
silence and the ultimate benefit ... of any reasonable doubt”.246
While defining what “beyond a reasonable doubt” means and figuring out how to instruct
a jury about it has given the courts trouble from time to time,247 the real flashpoint of s. 11(d)
litigation on the presumption of innocence has been the Crown’s burden, and in particular when
and how it may be shifted. The whole point of the presumption of innocence in application is a
utilitarian and classically liberal one: that the state must justify any interference with the
otherwise sanctified freedom of the individual, and thus the accused is entitled to do nothing, to
stand silent and put the Crown to the strict proof of the allegations against him. Yet, consistently
246
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with the overall approach of the Charter, the Court has been prepared to countenance limitations
on this right when, in the language of s. 1, such limitations can be “demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society.”
The difficulty in the case law has stemmed from the operation of devices which are
generally known in evidence law as “presumptions,” an inelegant term of art248 which basically
describes rules of law (both statutory and common law) that relieve a party of having to prove
specific facts in particular circumstances. In 1982 both the Criminal Code and the common law
were, as today, replete with presumptions, many of which required the accused to prove or
disprove particular facts – essentially giving the Crown a hand up by shifting the burden of proof
onto the accused. This problem first came before the Supreme Court in R v Oakes,249 which
involved section 8 of the Narcotics Control Act250 which provided that if the Crown had proven
possession of a particular amount of a controlled substance, the accused was presumed to have
possessed it for the purpose of trafficking. The Court held that a rule which required the accused
to disprove an element of the offence, on the balance of probabilities, breached s. 11(d) because
“it would [therefore] be possible for a conviction to occur despite the existence of a reasonable
doubt.”251
A short two years later, in R v Whyte,252 the Court clarified that this rationale was not
simply attached to elements of the offence, but was of more general application:
248
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[T]he distinction between elements of the offence and other aspects of the
charge is irrelevant to the s. 11(d) inquiry. The real concern is not whether the
accused must disprove an element or prove an excuse, but that an accused may
be convicted while a reasonable doubt exists. When that possibility exists, there
is a breach of the presumption of innocence.
The exact characterization of a factor as an essential element, a collateral
factor, an excuse, or a defence should not affect the analysis of the presumption
of innocence. It is the final effect of a provision on the verdict that is decisive. If
an accused is required to prove some fact on the balance of probabilities to avoid
conviction, the provision violates the presumption of innocence because it
permits a conviction in spite of a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact
as to the guilt of the accused. The trial of an accused in a criminal matter cannot
be divided neatly into stages, with the onus of proof on the accused at an
intermediate stage and the ultimate onus on the Crown.253
On this rationale, then, the Court was willing to find s. 11(d) breaches arising from a
variety of legislative tools. For example, the presumption of sanity in s. 16(4) of the Criminal
Code was found to violate s. 11(d) (though it was upheld under s. 1) because it “allows a factor
which is essential for guilt to be presumed.”254 In Keegstra,255 the offence of willful promotion
of hatred was held to be in breach because the accused was required to establish that the
statements communicated were true in order to make out a defence.256
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As the Court has plumbed more deeply into presumption-type devices it has sharpened
the analytical focus and introduced some variety into the s. 11(d) matrix. Whether a particular
presumption will be found to violate s. 11(d) depends upon its wording and more importantly its
effect in practice. Full-on reverse onus provisions, like those in Oakes or Chaulk, will always
violate s. 11(d) because they shift the burden of proof to the accused. A similar finding has been
made regarding Code provisions that shift a burden of leading evidence to the accused but which
require a finding if he does not do so. So, in R v Downey,257 the Court found a violation in what
is now s. 212(3) of the Code which provides that “evidence that a person lives with or is
habitually in the company of a prostitute or lives in a common bawdy-house is, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, proof that the person lives on the avails of prostitution” (emphasis
added). This, too, could cause a conviction even if the accused had managed to raise a reasonable
doubt without adducing any evidence on that particular point.
On the other hand, where a “presumption” is not mandatory, in the sense that the trier of
fact may but not must draw the inference from the basic fact, the courts have found that s. 11(d)
is not offended. Such devices are often called “permissive inferences” and are more
constitutionally benign. For example, the common law rule that a trier of fact may, but not must,
draw the inference that an accused stole goods where he is found in explained possession of them
soon after the theft has been found not to violate the presumption of innocence.258 It may be wise
for the accused to adduce evidence to the contrary, but no burden of proof is shifted. This
reasoning has been applied to the “air of reality” test, under which an accused who wishes to
mount most affirmative defences must be able to point to some evidence capable of raising a
reasonable doubt. Since this does not require the accused to prove anything on any standard this
does not breach s. 11(d).259
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With a few other affirmative defences, however, the Court has been willing to impose a
reverse onus on the accused, such as that of sane automatism.260 Indeed, by contrast to its
willingness to find violations of s. 11(d), the Court has been quite willing to uphold most
presumptions as being justifiable limitations under s. 1. After the initial striking down in Oakes,
the Court has found most presumptive devices to be saved under section 1, typically expressing
sympathy for the difficulties of law enforcement and prosecution without the aid of the
devices.261 The “minimal impairment” requirement from the Oakes test for s. 1, which appeared
robust in Oakes itself, has typically given way to an inquiry as to whether a lesser impairment
would not do, usually answered in the affirmative. This has earned the Court criticism on the
basis that permissive inferences should, in most cases, be sufficient to assist the Crown while not
impairing the Charter rights too onerously.262
Something of a change in course may be indicated by the Court’s most recent findings on
s. 11(d) in its 2012 judgment in R v St-Onge Lamoureux,263 which dealt with the “Carter
defence”264 to the charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over .08.
Section 258 of the Criminal Code contained presumptions of identity (i.e. the results of a blood
alcohol analysis were presumed to correspond with the accused’s blood alcohol level at the time
of the alleged offence) and of accuracy (i.e. the results of the blood test were presumed to be
accurate). The section indicated that the presumptions could be overcome by “evidence to the
contrary.” A Carter defence amounted to an accused testifying as to the amount of alcohol he or
she had consumed and calling an expert to testify about what blood alcohol level that ought to
have resulted in: if the breathalyser showed some different result, the argument went, then it
must have malfunctioned or been operated improperly. Despite the seeming unlikelihood that
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such evidence (often referred to as the “two beer defence”) could overcome the presumption of
accuracy regarding a scientific test, the Carter defence was quite successful.265
In response, in 2008 Parliament amended the Code to essentially deprive the accused of
the benefit of the Carter defence. As Justice Deschamps for the majority described the effect of
the new provisions, while the accused still only had to raise a reasonable doubt:
The statutory amendments affect the evidence that can be adduced to rebut the
presumption of accuracy and the first presumption of identity. The combined
effect of the requirements set out in s. 258(1)(c) and s. 258(1)(d.01) Cr. C. is to
preclude the Carter defence in its previous form. The accused can no longer
simply present a Carter defence. Rather, he or she must (1) raise a doubt that the
instrument was functioning or was operated properly, (2) show that the
malfunction or improper operation of the instrument resulted in the
determination that his or her blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit, and
(3) show that his or her blood alcohol level would not in fact have exceeded that
limit at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed.266
Importantly, s. 258(1)(d.01) specified that the Carter-type evidence could not constitute
evidence of malfunctioning or improper operation.
The central problem, as the majority saw it, was that while the Crown still had to prove
that the accused’s blood alcohol level exceeded .08, the Crown did not have to prove that the test
results were valid (in spite of evidence that invalidity was not at all a speculative concern), and
thus “the accused must nevertheless raise a doubt about a fact that the prosecution has not
established in accordance with the rules of criminal evidence.”267
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On the basis of this analysis the majority unsurprisingly found that the provisions
breached s. 11(d). However, the Court also struck down the second and third of the requirements
set out above on the basis that they could not be saved under s. 1. The legislative objective – to
give the reliability of the test results a weight consistent with their scientific value – was held to
be sufficiently important. The first obligation on the accused, to show malfunctioning or
improper operation, was both rationally connected to the goal and minimally impairing, since
breathalyser test results were usually quite reliable. The second requirement, that the accused
show that the malfunction led to the over .08 reading, was held not to be minimally impairing
since, with the exclusion of the Carter defence, there was no appreciable way for the accused to
prove this connection.
The third requirement, that the accused show that his or her level was in fact not over .08
at the time of the test, was not rationally connected to the goal; nor was it minimally impairing,
since:
If the accused has already identified a defect that could cast doubt on the
reliability of the results, it is difficult to justify requiring the court to
nevertheless accept that the results have probative value if the accused has
produced no evidence regarding his or her blood alcohol level. This amounts to
saying that, where a court has a doubt about an essential element of the offence,
it must nevertheless convict unless the accused can present evidence tending to
show that he or she is innocent.268
In effect, the Court concluded that the first requirement alone was sufficient to keep
frivolous challenges to breathalyser evidence from interfering with their usefulness, given that
that requirement could only be met by the presentation of evidence directly about the functioning
of the machine. That first requirement was upheld but the other two were struck down.
ii) “Fair and Public Hearing”
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In Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v Canada (Director of Investigation and Research,
Restrictive Trade Practices), Justice La Forest wrote that the “right of an accused to a fair
hearing is constitutionalized by s. 11(d), a right that would in any event be protected under s. 7 as
an aspect of the principles of fundamental justice.”269 This quotation implicitly describes the
court’s emphasis, which has been to use s. 7 to deal with the fair trial/hearing rights of
individuals charged with offences.270 The most common use of this aspect of s. 11(d) by the
courts is as part of a “belt and braces” means of expressing the accused’s constitutional right to a
fair trial. For example, in two mid-1990s cases271 the Supreme Court dealt with a defence motion
to exclude evidence that had been gathered in the U.S. by American police, because the methods
of gathering the evidence would not have met Charter standards. While the Court determined
that the usual Charter investigative rights could not apply to foreign police acting on the territory
of their own state, if the means by which the evidence was gathered would nonetheless render
the trial unfair then it could be excluded under ss. 7 and 11(d).272
Occasionally courts will encounter an issue which makes them choose to deal with a
matter as one of whether an accused will receive a fair hearing or trial strictly under s. 11(d),
quite apart from the s. 7 framework. For example, in R v L’Espinay,273 the Court of Appeal
dismissed a motion by an accused for a remedy on the basis that the Crown’s failure to provide
him with a transcript of his trial at the end of the trial deprived him of his right to a “fair hearing”
on the appeal, under s. 11(d). In R v Edgars, 274 the court held that the accused’s section 11(d)
right to a fair trial was not infringed by the refusal to fund his pre-trial application. However, for
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the most part these kinds of issues can be dealt with under s. 7, and the typical inclination of the
courts is to do so.
iii) “Independent and Impartial Tribunal”
The primary focus regarding independence/impartiality has been on judges. Any judges
who will preside over matters where an individual is charged with an offence – predominantly
from the courts of criminal jurisdiction – are required by s. 11(d) to be “independent and
impartial.” The leading case is still Valente v The Queen,275 where an accused convicted of
careless driving challenged the jurisdiction of a Provincial Court judge to hear the appeal on the
basis that these judges were not independent or impartial. In an oft-quoted passage the Court
said:
Although there is obviously a close relationship between independence and
impartiality, they are nevertheless separate and distinct values or requirements.
Impartiality refers to a state of mind or attitude of the tribunal in relation to the
issues and the parties in a particular case. The word "impartial" […] connotes
absence of bias, actual or perceived. The word "independent" in s. 11(d) reflects
or embodies the traditional constitutional value of judicial independence. As
such, it connotes not merely a state of mind or attitude in the actual exercise of
judicial functions, but a status or relationship to others, particularly to the
executive branch of government, that rests on objective conditions or
guarantees.276
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The standards regarding the determination for actual or perceived bias emerged from the
common law277 but were adopted as the framework for the s. 11(d) right, in both Valente and in
the Court’s subsequent decision on the independence of Provincial Court judges, Provincial
Judges Reference.278 Credible allegations of actual judicial bias are quite rare, and the bulk of the
authorities simply make reference to the test being whether there is a reasonable apprehension of
bias.279 The applicable principles are those set out by the Court in its recent decision in
Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada:280
(i)

a judge’s impartiality is presumed;

(ii)

a party arguing for disqualification must establish that the circumstances
justify a finding that the judge must be disqualified;

(iii)

the criterion of disqualification is the reasonable apprehension of bias;

(iv)

the question is what would an informed, reasonable and right-minded
person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, and having thought
the matter through, conclude;

(v)

the test for disqualification is not satisfied unless it is proved that the
informed, reasonable and right-minded person would think that it is more
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likely than not that the judge, whether consciously or unconsciously,
would not decide fairly;
(vi)

the test requires demonstration of serious grounds on which to base the
apprehension;

(vii)

each case must be examined contextually and the inquiry is factspecific.281

The onus, as noted, is on the party alleging bias and it is difficult to overcome the “very
strong” presumption of judicial impartiality.282 This is perhaps most strongly illustrated by the
cases in which judges’ impartiality was challenged because they had been Crown prosecutors
prior to their appointment and had some involvement with the particular matter then before
them283 – a particularly pertinent situation of late given the high number of Crown prosecutors
appointed to the judiciary by the federal and provincial governments. One Alberta Court of
Appeal decision provides some interesting practical insight into the desirability of making it
difficult to rebut the presumption of judicial impartiality:
Canada routinely appoints former Crown prosecutors as judges. Almost all were
full-time government employees, in prosecutors’ offices of varying sizes, some
very small, some large. Canadian courts never disqualify such judges from
hearing criminal trials which were “in the office” before they were appointed. If
courts did, many Provincial Court judges would have little to do the first few
years after their appointment, and the chaos and delay in towns or cities with
only one resident judge would be appalling.284
281
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As to independence, the Court in Valente prescribed three requirements: security of
tenure,285 financial security286 and institutional independence.287 Regarding security of tenure,
judges can be removed only for cause and exclusively by a body (such as the Canadian Judicial
Council) independent from any other governmental decision-maker. A military court recently
held that it violated security of tenure to subject military judges to five-year limited terms of
appointment, even subject to renewal.288 On the other hand, the removal of justices of the peace
who exercised judicial functions because they did not meet the qualifications formulated by an
independent Judicial Council and enshrined in legislation did not violate security of tenure; it
was neither arbitrary nor discretionary, but necessary to uphold the proper administration of
justice.289
Regarding financial security, the Court in Valente said that the “essence of such security
is that the right to salary and pension should be established by law and not be subject to arbitrary
interference by the Executive in a manner that could affect judicial independence,” and that these
principles applied to pensions as well.290 Judges must be paid at a sufficient rate that they can
“appear to be free from political interference through economic manipulation by the other
branches of government.”291 As to institutional independence, the Court held in Valente that this
related to “matters of administration bearing directly on the exercise of its judicial function,”
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things like “assignment of judges, sittings of the court […] allocation of court rooms and
direction of administrative staff.”292
Finally, it is clear, even axiomatic, that the requirement for a tribunal to be “independent
and impartial” also applies to the jury in jury trials. The Supreme Court recently emphasized this
aspect in the context of two of the “jury vetting” cases, R v Yumnu293 and R v Davey.294 In the
course of dealing with challenges to a practice of screening of jurors by the Ontario Crown, the
Court wrote (in Yumnu):
[I]t is essential to keep in mind that from start to finish, the jury selection
process is designed to make good on the constitutional promise, enshrined in s.
11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, that everyone charged
with an offence has the right to be tried by an independent and impartial
tribunal. Attempts by one side or the other to obtain a favourable jury are
inimical to that ideal and the parties should be guided by this and conduct
themselves accordingly.295
It is perhaps odd to hear the Court describe the right of an accused person to an
independent and impartial jury as “an ideal,” since its Charter jurisprudence has always been
clear that the various rights enshrined in the Charter are meant to establish a bare minimum of
constitutional protections. The use of the word “ideal” suggests that a proper jury is something to
which the law aspires, rather than something it requires. However, this may simply be a case of
loose language, or perhaps recognition of the necessary, human imperfections of the jury
selection system.
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In any event, it is clear that while each potential juror is presumed at the outset of a trial
to be capable of discharging her function in an unbiased and impartial manner,296 this can be
challenged by the accused. As the Court has noted:
The threshold question is not whether the ground of alleged partiality will create
such partiality in a juror, but rather whether it could create that partiality which
would prevent a juror from being indifferent as to the result. In the end, there
must exist a realistic potential for the existence of partiality, on a ground
sufficiently articulated in the application, before the challenger should be
allowed to proceed.297
While the scope of criminal procedure law regarding juror challenging is beyond the
current scope, the most interesting line of case law has been about challenging jurors for racial
prejudice (or its potential) and the push and pull this has caused with the law of judicial notice.298
e) “not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause”
It is passing odd that paragraph 11(e) of the Charter guarantees a right to reasonable
“bail” – not because it is odd to guarantee the right, but because the word “bail” was removed
from the Criminal Code in 1971 and replaced (via the Bail Reform Act299) with a system formally
known as “judicial interim release.”300 The word bail is still in common usage, however, and the
Supreme Court ruled in its first major case on 11(e) that “bail” refers to all forms of judicial
interim release.301
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Generally speaking, the treatment of s. 11(e) of the Charter has dovetailed with the
philosophical approach taken by the 1971 amendment creating judicial interim release, which is
to impose as little interference with the individual as necessary, and with the starting assumption
being that the accused is entitled to be released pending trial with only such restrictions as can be
reasonably justified by the Crown.302 Naturally, the main focus of litigation under s. 11(e) has
been the denial of bail.303 As the Supreme Court has defined the s. 11(e) protection, bail can only
be denied for “just cause,” which means: 1) that bail can be denied “only in a narrow set of
circumstances”; and 2) any denial of bail must necessary for the proper functioning of the bail
system and “not undertaken for any purpose extraneous to the bail system.”304
Section 515(10) of the Criminal Code provides that the Crown may show cause as to why
the accused should remain in custody until trial, on any of three grounds. The first two grounds
have not attracted a great deal of constitutional dispute: a) the detention is necessary to ensure
the accused’s attendance in court; and b) the detention is necessary for the protection or safety of
the public. The third or “tertiary” ground for detention, s. 515(10)(c), has been more
controversial. It provides in its current form:
(c) if the detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of
justice, having regard to all the circumstances, including (i) the apparent strength
of the prosecution’s case, (ii) the gravity of the offence, (iii) the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offence, including whether a firearm was
302
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used, and (iv) the fact that the accused is liable, on conviction, for a potentially
lengthy term of imprisonment or, in the case of an offence that involves, or
whose subject-matter is, a firearm, a minimum punishment of imprisonment for
a term of three years or more.305
The former version of this provision had contained general language allowing detention
“in the public interest.” In Morales, this older version had been struck down for being too vague
and imprecise.306 A revised version faced the Supreme Court of Canada in the 2002 case of R v
Hall,307 and language in it allowing detention “on any other just cause being shown” was struck
down on grounds of vagueness, much like the earlier “in the public interest.” However, the Court
split 5-4 on whether “maintaining confidence in the administration of justice” was a
constitutional ground for detention. The majority judgment, written by Chief Justice McLachlin
saw it as a necessary supplement to the other two grounds, given the impact on the community in
a case such as Hall itself, where the accused was alleged to have been involved in a horrific
decapitation, the community was disturbed and the Crown’s case was said to be compelling. The
minority judgment, written by Justice Iacobucci, held that the ground allowed a troubling
discretion on the part of judges to refuse bail in a situation where neither public safety nor the
prospect of the accused’s attendance in court presented any issues.308
Even the majority appeared disturbed by this latter issue and provided a suggestion that
this tertiary ground should only be used infrequently.309 Many courts of appeal have accepted
that the ground should be used sparingly,310 though the treatment is not consistent and there is
305
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some division.311 If the recent amendments to s. 515(10)(c) are susceptible to challenge under s.
11(e), it may not be on the basis that they invoke firearms, as the presence of firearms has
become broadly accepted as a factor grounding a denial of release on the tertiary ground.312
Generally, in keeping with the overall approach to minimize intrusions into liberty, the
Crown is required to justify its desire for detention by proving the need for it. However, there are
some provisions in s. 515 that reverse the onus and require detention unless the accused can
show cause not to do so. Most notably, s. 515(6) reverses the onus in cases where: a) the offence
charged was alleged to be committed while the accused was out on bail; b) the offence charged
was a criminal organization, terrorism or national security offence; c) the offence related to
failing to attend court as ordered in some previous process; or d) the offence was punishable by
life imprisonment under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.313 Two of these provisions
were challenged in Pearson and Morales, but upheld by the Court both times. The Court held
that the presumption of innocence as manifest in s. 11(e) was satisfied whenever “just cause”
could be shown, due to the unique nature of the bail process.314
f) “except in the case of an offence under military law tried before a military tribunal to the
benefit of trial by jury where the maximum punishment for the offence is imprisonment for
five years or a more severe punishment”
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There was no equivalent to s. 11(f) in the Canadian Bill of Rights and a nationallyapplicable, constitutional right to a jury trial was thus an innovation under the Charter.315 There
was, to some extent, a common law right to a jury trial which survives in varying forms
throughout the provinces.316 However, a constitutional right to a jury in civil trials has been
rejected.317 The clear wording excluding military trials has been upheld as constitutional,318
though the leading authority interprets “an offence under military law” as being one which not
only qualifies as an offence under the National Defence Act319 but also has a “real military
nexus.”320 “Person” in this context has been held to exclude corporations.321
Section 11(f) operates alongside the provisions of the Criminal Code, which place certain
practical and legal limitations on the availability of a jury trial. Some of this hinges on the
available “maximum punishment”; for example, if the accused is charged with a summary
conviction offence or the Crown elects to proceed by way of summary conviction regarding a
hybrid offence, the maximum punishment will not approach five years and thus the accused’s s.
11(f) right will not kick in.322 For indictable offences323 the accused may elect trial before a
judge without a jury and thus waive her right to trial by jury; however, there are re-election
315
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provisions that may be accessed by the accused.324 The Supreme Court held in R v Turpin that
the right is one to a jury trial but not a right to the mode of trial of one’s choice.325 Accordingly,
an accused can be restricted in re-electing, in the sense that having elected trial by jury he does
not necessarily have a right to re-elect to a trial by judge alone. For example, in R v Martin the
accused was not permitted to re-elect to have a jury trial for some counts in an indictment and a
judge-alone trial for others,326 while in R v Niemi the court was content that an accused’s reelection for a jury in his new trial after appeal could only proceed with the consent of the
Crown.327
Waiver of the s. 11(f) right, as is usually the case with any waiver of a constitutional
right, must be “clear and unequivocal” and made with full awareness of the consequences.328
Section 598 of the Criminal Code, which provides that any accused who absconds from a jury
trial may not re-elect a jury trial without a legitimate excuse for absconding, has been held to
violate the s. 11(f) right on the basis that absconding does not meet the high standard for waiver.
However, the violation was saved under s. 1, due to the strong public interest in not burdening
the public with wasted time serving on juries.329
In terms of jury selection, challenges have been made under s. 11(f) in situations where
the accused felt the jury would be under-representative in some way. In R v F.(A.)330 the accused,
a member of the Nishnawbe-Aski First Nation, argued that he was entitled to a jury of his
324
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cultural peers – an argument rejected on the basis that the jury should reflect the community as a
whole and that racial bias or cultural disparities could be dealt with via expert evidence or
challenging jurors for cause. Similarly, in R v Teerhuis-Moar,331 the Court of Appeal upheld a
finding that a jury that was even arguably under-representative of a particular racial/cultural
group332 did not violate s. 11(f) because the right did not extend to having a jury that is a racial
microcosm of a particular community. However, a recent case noted the importance of the
government maintaining the integrity of the jury list so that the broader community is at least
accurately represented; in R v Buckingham the court found a ss. 11(f) and 11(d) breach due to the
jury list not having been updated since 1999, some eight years before the trial, and thus the list
did not contain “large segments of the community.”333
One of the most interesting applications of s. 11(f) has been in determining what is
required in the interaction of accused, judge and jury at a criminal trial. In particular, the higher
courts have recently focused on jury instructions334 and whether there is a point at which a
judge’s instructions to a jury may deprive the accused of her right to a jury trial. It was
determined relatively early on, in R v Osolin,335 that s. 11(f) does not require the trial judge to
charge the jury with deciding upon any defence mounted, pleaded or argued by the accused. The
decision as to whether a particular defence has an “air of reality” and thus must be put to the jury
is a question of law within the sole discretion of the trial judge. The right to trial by jury, in other
words, does not entitle the accused to consume the court’s time and the jury’s energy with
clearly baseless defences.
The most recent and interesting case law has focused on when the trial judge’s charge
usurps the fundamental role of the jury. The jury is, of course, the “trier of fact” in a trial and
331
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(subject to limited exceptions) makes all of the fundamental determinations of what happened in
a given case, thus driving the ultimate verdict. While trial judges are permitted under common
law to comment on the evidence and even offer opinions on the fundamental issues the jury is
deciding, under both the common law rule and s. 11(f) the judge must not remove the decisionmaking power from the jury by instructing them to convict.336 The Supreme Court held in R v
Gunning337 that this was true in part as well as in whole; the trial judge had instructed the jury
that one of the elements of the offence had been proven by the Crown, which the Court held to
be an error that deprived the accused of the s. 11(f) right.
Ascertaining the actual location of the line which the judge must not cross via her
comments to the jury has been controversial. In R v Lawes,338 the accused was tried for
involvement in a murder that occurred during a bank robbery and in his charge the trial judge
expressed sentiments which were, putting it mildly, sympathetic to the Crown’s position. The
accused challenged the common law rule as being inconsistent with s. 11(f), but Justice Doherty,
for a unanimous Court of Appeal, rejected this argument:
In summary, therefore, the common law rule allows the trial judge to comment
on the evidence provided it is made clear to the jury that they are not bound by
the judge’s views, that the judge’s opinions are not stronger than the facts
warrant and that the opinions are not overstated to the point where it is likely
that the jury will be overawed by them. By setting the limit on judicial comment
at the point where the comments might impermissibly erode or threaten the fact
finding and ultimate arbiter role of the jury, the common law rule fosters rather
than impedes the values underlying s. 11(f) of the Charter.339
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Upholding the overall requirement that the judge not usurp the role of the jury required
the Supreme Court to deal with the potential for “jury nullification” in the 2006 case of R v
Krieger.340 The accused, charged with unlawfully producing marijuana, admitted the elements of
the offence but pleaded not guilty and mounted a defence of necessity, on the basis of his need of
the drug for management of a debilitating illness. The trial judge decided that the defence was
not available on the evidence and directed the jury to return a guilty verdict. The jury did so,
though during its deliberations it asked for a copy of the oath the jurors had taken and two jurors
asked to be excused because their personal convictions would not allow them to render a guilty
verdict.341 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Fish ruled that the jury had understood they
could not, of their own accord, acquit the accused, and that this deprived him of his right to trial
by jury under s. 11(f) which he had chosen to exercise by way of his plea of not guilty. Even if
the trial judge viewed the evidence against an accused as “overwhelming,” the verdict had to be
that of the jury – the trial judge was only empowered to direct an acquittal if the evidence was
insufficient, and could not direct a guilty verdict. The Court cited and discussed English
authority to the effect that “juries are not entitled as a matter of right to refuse to apply the law –
but they do have the power to do so when their consciences permit of no other course.”342
g) “not to be found guilty on account of any act or omission unless, at the time of the act or
omission, it constituted an offence under Canadian or international law or was criminal
according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations”
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Consistently with its wording, this paragraph protects individuals from being convicted
for conduct which did not constitute an offence at the time it was committed. It is essentially
curtails the ability of Parliament to create retroactive criminal laws, though otherwise both the
common law and statutory law can have retroactive effect.343 It would bar the making of any
substantive criminal law provision more onerous to the accused, including defences, though it
does not apply to evidence or procedure.344
It is the international law aspects of s. 11(g) that are the most interesting and that have
been the subject of the only real attention it has received in litigation.345 The provision
implements Canada’s obligation not to create retroactive criminal law in article 15(1) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and more broadly it is a component of the
principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege) that is part of both international law346 and
Canadian common law. A major impetus behind the wording was to allow Canada to prosecute
war criminals for acts which were not part of Canadian criminal law when they were committed,
but which had been criminalized under international law at the time – a concern which was front
and centre at the time of the Charter’s drafting, as it was becoming apparent that Canada had
become a haven for WWII war criminals.347
The provision was considered by the Supreme Court in R v Finta,348 an appeal arising
from the prosecution of an alleged Hungarian war criminal for crimes committed during WWII.
Finta was charged under Criminal Code amendments from 1987 which added war crimes and
crimes against humanity committed outside Canada, and those provisions were challenged under
343
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s. 11(g) on the basis that no such offences existed in Canadian law at the relevant time. The
majority of the Court held that the new Code provisions simply codified prohibitions on conduct
which was already unlawful under international law at the time of Finta’s alleged crimes.349
This aspect of s. 11(g) is permissive, in a sense, rather than being a “protection,” since it
has allowed the Crown to implement a robust approach to the prosecution of international
crimes. The international law rationale underpins the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes
Act,350 which replaced the 1987 Code amendments. This legislation allows for the prosecution of
the accused for extraterritorial international crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes) where the act in question “at the time and in the place of its commission, constitutes a
crime against humanity [or war crime or act of genocide], according to customary international
law or conventional international law or by virtue of its being criminal according to the general
principles of law recognized by the community of nations.”351 This approach has been called
“retrospective” rather than retroactive, since it “attaches new procedural or jurisdictional
consequences to an act that was already criminal at the time of its commission.”352
h) “if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it again and, if finally found guilty
and punished for the offence, not to be tried or punished for it again”
The prohibition on double jeopardy is one well-known to the common law, and is
probably most famously set out in the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.353 Section
349
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11(h) imposes a constitutional rule against double jeopardy. It is clearly “a” rule and not “the”
rule, however, because it exists alongside a group of other common law and statutory rules that
seek to prevent much the same mischief. In the recent case of R v Mahalingan, the Supreme
Court was examining the rule of issue estoppel, moving Justice Charron in her concurring
reasons to state:
Issue estoppel is but one of many legal doctrines concerned with the prevention
of abusive relitigation. In the criminal context, related concepts include the
doctrine of abuse of process; the rule against multiple convictions in Kienapple;
the rule against collateral attack; the codified pleas of autrefois
acquit and autrefois convict under s. 607 of the Code; and s. 11(h) of
the Charter.354
Covering the entire breadth of this area of law, on the basis that s. 11(h) is “related”, is
unnecessary here and we are content to adopt Professor Stuart’s remarks that, first, “[t]he subject
is one of the utmost complexity and subtlety and is certainly in need of clarification,” and that
“[t]he relationship between s. 11(h) and the existing doctrines protecting double jeopardy and
double punishment cannot be considered to have been determined.”355
The basics of s. 11(h)’s application have been squared away for some time. It applies
where a person has been “finally acquitted” or “finally found guilty and punished,” and the
Supreme Court determined in R v Morgentaler (No. 2) that “finally” meant “after the appellate
procedures have been completed, otherwise there would be no point or meaning in the word
‘finally.’”356 In terms of it applying to conviction or acquittal for “an offence,” as we have
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”
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seen357 the Wigglesworth test provides that an offence attracts s. 11 protection if it is of a public
nature or has true penal consequences. In R v Shubley the Court, applying Wigglesworth, noted
that “s. 11(h) provides protection against duplication in proceedings of a criminal nature. It does
not preclude two different proceedings, one criminal and the other not criminal, flowing from the
same act.”358 In that case, prison disciplinary proceedings did not involve true penal
consequences and thus it did not offend s. 11(h) for the accused to be tried criminally for assault
after having been disciplined for it by prison authorities.359 In the extradition case of Schmidt360
the Supreme Court ruled that extradition proceedings did not fall under s. 11(h) since their goal
was simply to determine whether there was a case to be tried in the requesting state. Any double
jeopardy defence available to the person sought was best made at the trial in the requesting state
itself.
It is clear, as well, that the Court views the s. 11(h) protection to be available only where
the second proceedings are for an offence which is identical, or nearly so, to the offence tried in
the first proceeding. It was in this way that the accused in Wigglesworth was able to be tried
criminally for the assault which had formed the basis of his prosecution for a major service
offence under the RCMP Act – while both were “offences,” each involved different elements and
provided accountability in a different manner.361 This reasoning often defeats claims of s. 11(h)
protection from criminal charges after convictions for provincial highway safety offences.362 In R
v van Rassel a police officer had been acquitted in the US on bribery charges but was not
protected by s. 11(h) from trial in Canada for breach of trust based on the same conduct because
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each offence was based on a different set of duties owed, respectively, to the US public and the
Canadian public.363 It is safe to describe this protection, as Professor Stuart does, as “narrow.”364
Recent traffic in s. 11(h) cases has involved the double punishment aspect. A number of
challenges have been made to sex offender registration laws at both the provincial and federal
levels on the basis that s. 11(h) is infringed by the requirement to be entered onto a registry as
well as being sentenced, but all have foundered on the finding that entry onto the registry does
not constitute “punishment.”365 A different result was recently reached, however, in a challenge
to the federal government’s toughening of the parole laws. In Whaling v Canada (Attorney
General),366 three British Columbia inmates mounted a s. 11(h) challenge to the provisions of the
Abolition of Early Parole Act367 which repealed the “accelerated parole review” provisions of the
Corrections and Conditional Release Act.368 Under the latter provisions, which were in effect
when the three inmates were sentenced, they could have obtained day parole after serving onesixth of their sentences so long as a Parole Board determined there were no reasonable grounds
to believe they would commit a violent offence if released. The default provisions did not kick in
until they were six months short of having served one-third of their sentences and imposed a
more onerous test for eligibility. The transitional provisions of the new legislation retroactively
repealed the accelerated review provisions for people currently serving sentences, and had the
effect of extending the sentences of the applicant inmates and imposing a higher bar for parole
eligibility.
A unanimous Court of Appeal upheld the summary trial judge’s decision to strike down
the retroactive repeal of the accelerated review provisions as amounting to double punishment
363
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under s. 11(h) and as not being saved by s. 1. Rejecting a Crown argument that delayed parole
eligibility could not amount to “punishment,” the Court held:
The trial judge found that the retrospective repeal of APR increased the
harshness of the sentences of the respondents by requiring them to serve more
time in jail, and did so without the discretionary intervention of the Board. The
effect of the legislation was no different from that of parole ineligibility imposed
by a judge, and the jurisprudence is clear and consistent that delayed parole
ineligibility is ‘punishment’ [….]
Further, the effect of AEPA on the respondents clearly falls within the
definition of “punishment” articulated in Rodgers: it is one of the sanctions to
which the respondents are liable, imposed in furtherance of the principles and
purposes of sentencing: rehabilitation, reintegration into the community,
protection of society, confidence in the administration of justice, denunciation
and deterrence.
I agree with the trial judge that the retrospective application of
the AEPA to the respondents violates their right not to be punished again
under s. 11(h) of the Charter.369
The Court also agreed with the summary trial judge that the law could not be saved by s.
1, as changing the parole eligibility rules retroactively was not necessary to achieve the
objectives of the legislation and did not impair the infringed rights as little as possible.370
i) “if found guilty of the offence and if the punishment for the offence has been varied
between the time of commission and the time of sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser
punishment”
369
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Paragraph 11(i) involves a fairly technical protection against a discrete sort of
occurrence, described succinctly by Professor Hogg:
The case for which s. 11(i) is designed is where the penalty for an offence has
been changed after an accused person committed the offence, but before he is
sentenced. Section 11(i) provides that the accused is entitled to “the benefit of
the lesser punishment.” If the penalty was increased, the old penalty applies; if
the penalty was reduced, the new penalty applies.371
The bulk of judicial interpretation regarding s. 11(i) has been on the issue of to what it
does not apply, as the kind of situation to which it does apply is reasonably obvious. In a
prominent case, R v Johnson,372 the Supreme Court considered the case of a man convicted of a
sexual assault which took place in 1995 who was, at his sentencing hearing in 1998, sentenced as
a dangerous offender. However, in 1997 the Code had been amended to create a new category of
“long-term offender” which provided a more lenient sentencing regime. The Court agreed with
the accused’s argument that s. 11(i) demanded that the sentencing judge was required to consider
the long-term offender provisions, since not to do so would deprive the accused of at least the
potential for “the benefit of the lesser punishment.”373
Again, most of the case law has focused on whether particular consequences imposed by
laws amount to “punishment” and thus attract s. 11(i). The overall tone of judicial consideration
was captured by Justice Charron when she wrote, in R v Rodgers, that a “consequence will
constitute a punishment when it forms part of the arsenal of sanctions to which an accused may
be liable in respect of a particular offence and the sanction is one imposed in furtherance of the
purpose and principles of sentencing.” She noted, however, that this did not mean that
371
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“‘punishment’ under ss. 11(h) and 11(i) necessarily encompasses every potential consequence of
being convicted of a criminal offence, whether that consequence occurs at the time of sentencing
or not.”374 In that case the Supreme Court held that being ordered to provide a sample for a DNA
databank as the result of a conviction did not amount to a “punishment” as it was the equivalent
of a photograph or fingerprinting. Similarly, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that being
compelled to enter into a recognizance under s. 810.01 of the Criminal Code because, though the
provisions were coercive, they were required for maintaining the 810 proceeding rather than for
a punitive purpose.375
There are two issues which have attracted s. 11(i) scrutiny in the recent past. The first is
the transitions from the Juvenile Delinquents Act to the 1984 Young Offenders Act, and
eventually to the Youth Criminal Justice Act in 2003. As the sentencing regimes tended to
change significantly between the legislation a number of cases came up where accuseds argued
that s. 11(i) entitled them to more lenient treatment under the recent (or previous) enactment.
Some of these challenges were successful, and the case law has tended to be fairly
straightforward. The basic arc of each of them is: “The accused, now an adult, committed x
crime as a teenager, during the period of the Juvenile Delinquents Act, and since such and such
sentence was not available under that legislation, we must give him the benefit of the lesser
punishment.” The practical impact of giving the accused the “lesser punishment” does not mean
actually giving him that punishment, but rather not giving him the higher punishment.376
So, for example, in R v T.M.,377 the accused was convicted for assault causing bodily
harm before the coming into force of the YCJA but his sentencing hearing occurred after it came
into force. The Crown applied to invoke a “serious violent offence” designation, but as this
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would not have been available under the Young Offenders Act the court held that applying the
designation would violate s. 11(i).378
The second and more interesting issue has been the requirement for convicted persons to
be compelled to be entered into sex offender registries, either Christopher’s Law (Sex Offender
Registry)379 or the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (“SOIRA”).380 These laws have
attracted a large number of s. 11(i) challenges, and while some have been successful at the trial
level,381 none has survived appellate scrutiny. The appeal courts have roundly rejected the idea
that compelled compliance with a reporting order under this sort of legislation can be considered
“punishment” despite its coincidence with the sentencing phase. In R v Cross382 the Nova Scotia
Court of Appeal dismissed a s. 11(i) challenge to the SOIRA, reasoning that, inter alia: any
stigma which arose from registration stemmed from the conviction itself and not by way of
placement of the name in the registry; the information was closely guarded and would not result
in “tracking” or “tracing” of the offender in an offensive manner; the requirements were
inconvenient but did not rise to the level of a punitive effect; and it was not geared towards
deterrence or other sentencing goals, but rather crime-solving.383 The Ontario Court of Appeal
had earlier made a similar finding regarding Christopher’s Law in Dyck.384 Most recently, in R v
Ryan,385 this “not a punishment” reasoning was applied to amendments which extended the
registration period from twenty years to life.
C. Conclusion
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It is naturally difficult to draw any particular themes out of a somewhat mixed bag of
constitutional protections, even though they do all operate primarily within the criminal justice
context. It is worth noting, perhaps, that while the overall intent of the framers was to restrain in
some measure the power of the state, as we have discussed here this has not necessarily been the
result. As mentioned above, despite the advent of the Charter the range of police arrest and
detention powers has expanded, not contracted, since 1982. On the other hand, greater
protections have clearly emerged and on occasion purposive interpretation of even fairly wellestablished rights put unanticipated limits on some criminal law powers—an example of which is
the Supreme Court’s use of s. 11(d) to carve a number of presumptions out of the Criminal Code
and other legislation. A section like 11(g) had an oddly dual effect as it boosted the fortunes of
both the state and the accused; the accused because the principle of legality was enshrined in law
and no prosecutions could be undertaken for conduct that was not a crime at the relevant time;
and the state because, as the Finta case demonstrated, an accused could be tried for conduct
which was criminal under international law at the time, even though the specific crimes were not
on the books in Canada.
Analytically speaking, as we have mentioned, it is interesting to observe the development
of those rights which had pre-Charter provenance and contrast it with the development of those
which did not. However, such distinctions are simply details; what is clear is that the set of rights
enshrined in ss. 9, 10 and 11, buttressed by s. 7, has evolved into a dynamic battleground for the
testing of law enforcement powers in the light of constitutional values and public expectation.
This level of vitality—surprising, perhaps, given the passage of three decades—we think is likely
to continue.

